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1. Australia’s  financial  system  plays  an  essential  role  in  supporting  the 
economic  prosperity  of  Australians  by,  among  other  things,  providing 
consumers  and  businesses  with  banking,  investment,  superannuation  and 
insurance  services. Australia’s  financial  system has grown  strongly  in  recent 
years, particularly following the introduction of compulsory superannuation in 
1992. Financial assets have grown from around two years’ worth of Australia’s 
nominal  gross  domestic  product1  in  1997  to more  than  three  times  nominal 
gross  domestic  product  in  2013.  At  December  2014,  financial  institutions  in 
Australia controlled assets of around $6 trillion.2 
2. The  Australian  Securities  and  Investments  Commission  (ASIC)  is 
Australia’s corporate, financial markets, financial services and consumer credit 
regulator.  It seeks  to ensure  the markets  it regulates are  fair and  transparent, 
supported  by  confident  and  informed  investors  and  consumers.  It  has 




3. One  of  ASIC’s  most  important  responsibilities  is  to  ensure  that 
regulated  entities4  comply with  their  legal  obligations,  including  obligations 






1  Nominal gross domestic product is a common measure of the size of an economy and refers to the 
total market value of goods and services produced in Australia within a given period. 
2  Reserve Bank of Australia, Statistical Tables: Assets of Financial Institutions, available from 
<www.rba.gov.au/statistics/tables/xls/b01hist.xls> [accessed 16 March 2015]. 
3  ASIC, Annual Report 2013–14, pp. 19–21. In 2013–14, ASIC had operating expenditure of 
$341 million to discharge its responsibilities. 
4  Regulated entities in the context of ASIC’s regulatory activities include: corporations, auditors and 
liquidators registered under the Corporations Act 2001, Australian financial services licensees and 
Australian credit licensees. 
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 providing guidance  to regulated entities on how  to comply with  their 
obligations; and 
 communicating the actions that ASIC takes to inform regulated entities 
about  the standards  that  it expects and  the consequences of  failing  to 
meet those standards.5 
4. Where  there  is  non‐compliance  by  a  regulated  entity, ASIC  can  take 
enforcement action  to deal with and deter  the misconduct. This may  involve 
conducting  an  investigation  and:  taking  criminal  action  (such  as  seeking 
imprisonment); commencing civil proceedings (including seeking civil penalty 
orders);  taking  administrative  action  (such  as  banning  orders  and  imposing 
licence  conditions);  or  accepting  a  negotiated  outcome  (including  an 
enforceable  undertaking,  known  as  an  EU).  ASIC  has  adopted  a  graduated 
approach  to  enforcement,  with  the  more  severe  and  less  frequently  used 
sanctions being employed for serious misconduct, while responses such as EUs 
are used for less serious misconduct.  




undertake  specific  education  programs.  In  contrast  to  other  regulatory 
alternatives, an EU can be a  relatively quick  remedy where:  results are more 
certain than the outcomes of court proceedings;  it has the potential to change 
the compliance culture of an organisation; and it may achieve an outcome that 
is  comparable  to,  or  better  than,  that  obtained  in  court.  An  EU  is  not  an 
alternative  to commencing criminal action, and  is generally not used  in cases 
involving deliberate misconduct,  fraud, or  conduct  involving  a high  level of 
recklessness.  






5  ASIC, ASIC’s Strategic Framework, available from 
<http://download.asic.gov.au/media/2309568/strategicframework_nov2014_online_accessible.pdf> 
[accessed 22 January 2015]. 
Summary 
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7. Between 1  January 2012 and 30  June 2014, ASIC entered  into 53 EUs.6 
The  entities  involved  included  large  banks  and  other  financial  institutions, 
large  public  companies,  providers  of  credit,  and  individual  auditors  and 
liquidators. The EUs related to a wide variety of conduct, including: 
 misleading or deceptive conduct by financial institutions; 
 failures  by  company  auditors  and  liquidators  to  properly  carry  out 
their duties and functions; 
 poor advice provided by financial advisers; and 
 the  failure  of  Australian  financial  services  licensees  to  monitor  and 
supervise the financial services provided by their representatives. 
8. Following  acceptance  of  an  EU,  ASIC  monitors  compliance  with  the 




9. ASIC  has  five  Commissioners,  including  the  Chairman,  Deputy 
Chairman and three members (the Commission). Reporting to the Commission 
are 12 stakeholder  teams and  three enforcement  teams organised around  the 
industry segments regulated by ASIC. Each of  the  teams  is headed by one or 





10. In  June  2014,  the  Senate Economics References Committee  released  a 
report  on  its  inquiry  into  the  performance  of  ASIC.7  In  this  report,  the 
Committee  recognised  the  good  work  that  ASIC  has  done  in  a  challenging 
environment, but raised a number of concerns about the performance of ASIC, 
including  in  relation  to  its  use  of  EUs.  The  Committee’s  report  contained 
61 recommendations aimed at enabling ASIC to fulfil  its responsibilities more 
                                                     
6  From July 1998 (when EUs were introduced) to December 2014, ASIC accepted 388 EUs. 
7  Senate Economics References Committee, Performance of the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission, June 2014. 
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effectively.  The  report  also  raised  concerns  about  ASIC’s  enforcement 
decisions,  and  particularly  its  use  of  EUs.  In  summary,  issues  raised  in 
submissions and highlighted by  the Committee  included:  the use of EUs as a 
remedy for misconduct by large entities; the strength of terms included in EUs; 
the clarity of EUs  in describing  the alleged misconduct; and  the transparency 
of  the  monitoring  of  compliance  with  EUs.  The  report  included  a 
recommendation  that  the Auditor‐General undertake a performance audit of 
ASIC’s use of EUs. The Auditor‐General agreed to this request. 
Audit objective and criteria 
11. The  objective  of  the  audit  was  to  assess  the  effectiveness  of  the 
Australian  Securities  and  Investments  Commission’s  administration  of 
enforceable undertakings. 
12. To  form  a  conclusion  against  this  objective,  the  Australian  National 
Audit Office (ANAO) adopted the following high level criteria: 
 management  arrangements  are  in  place  that  support  the  effective, 
consistent and transparent administration of EUs;  






13. As  one  of  ASIC’s  suite  of  regulatory  responses,  enforceable 
undertakings  (EUs)  have  a  valuable  role  in  ASIC’s  overall  enforcement 
approach. EUs  are particularly  useful  in  addressing  less  serious misconduct 
where  the promisor  is  co‐operative. A potential  benefit  of EUs  is  in driving 
changes  in  a  promisor’s  compliance  culture  and  systems,  whereas  an 
administrative penalty  (or even a civil sanction) may not  lead  to behavioural 
change.  Since  their  introduction  in  1998,  ASIC  has  accepted  an  average  of 
24 EUs  per  year,  and  from  January  2012  to  June  2014,  53  of  ASIC’s 
1711 enforcement actions (three per cent) were EUs. 
14. In general, ASIC has effectively administered the EUs it has negotiated 
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undertaking  that  appropriately  address  the  misconduct;  and  monitoring 
adherence  to  those  terms  and  addressing  any  identified  non‐compliance. 
However, there is considerable scope to improve the record keeping processes 
supporting EU decisions  and  compliance monitoring,  as documentation was 
inconsistent,  dispersed  across  multiple  systems  and  not  always  readily 
available. In addition, ASIC does not measure or report on the effectiveness of 
EUs  in  achieving  intended  regulatory  outcomes,  including  greater  levels  of 
voluntary  compliance.  Improved  performance  measurement  and  reporting 
would  better  inform  key  stakeholders,  including  Parliament,  of  the 
effectiveness of ASIC’s regulation. 
15. In  relation  to  entering  into  EUs,  ASIC  has  accepted  offers  of  EUs 
consistently, transparently and in accordance with its policies and procedures. 
For  most  EUs  reviewed  by  the  ANAO  (83  per  cent)8,  there  was  sufficient 
documentation  to  demonstrate  that  accepting  an  EU  would  provide  an 
effective  regulatory  outcome9  and  no  instances  were  identified  where 
promisors were treated differently based on the size of their business. 
16. ASIC also had a sound basis for including particular terms in each EU, 
with  the  terms generally  aligning with  the non‐compliance  at which  the EU 
was  directed.  However,  ASIC  could  ensure  that  EUs  are  clearer  about  the 
misconduct  that  was  the  subject  of  ASIC’s  concerns.  ASIC  could  also 
strengthen its capacity to assess compliance with, and the effectiveness of, EUs 
by more consistently including in the terms of an EU the requirement that the 
promisor  report  back  to  ASIC  demonstrating  their  compliance  with  EU 
obligations.  This  information  will  better  inform  ASIC’s  monitoring  of  the 




process, and  the  reports provided by  the  expert were  satisfactory. However, 
there were  inconsistencies  in ASIC’s approach  to approving  the appointment 
of experts and their terms of reference.10 In February 2015, ASIC released new 
                                                     
8  The ANAO examined all 53 EUs concluded by ASIC between 1 January 2012 and 30 June 2014.  
9  Of the 53 EUs examined, in the seven instances where record keeping was insufficient, ASIC was 
able to advise the reasons why entering into an EU would provide an effective regulatory outcome. 
10  Of the 30 EUs that required an independent expert to be appointed, 13 did not provide for ASIC to 
approve the expert and/or their terms of reference. 
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public  guidance  that  is  expected  to  help  improve  processes  relating  to  the 
appointment of independent experts. 
18. The  ANAO  has  made  two  recommendations  aimed  at  improving 
ASIC’s  measurement  and  reporting  of  the  effectiveness  of  EUs,  and  its 
documentation of key decisions relating to EUs. 
Key findings by chapter 
Managing Enforceable Undertakings (Chapter 2) 
19. A key component of any regulatory regime is a sound compliance and 
enforcement  approach.  ASIC  follows  a  structured  process  to  identify  and 
prioritise  its  strategic  compliance  risks.  Once  risks  are  identified,  it  has  a 





public  guidance  (including  regulatory  guides  and  information  sheets),  and 
internal policies and procedures. ASIC also negotiates outcomes  that are not 
EUs.12 However, the role of these is less clear, as there is no policy, definition or 
register  for  these  other  negotiated  outcomes.  To  provide  more  certainty  to 
regulated  entities,  ASIC  should  consider  ways  to  provide  greater  clarity 
around the circumstances in which it accepts and enters into other negotiated 
outcomes. 
21. ASIC’s  organisational  arrangements  for  EUs  are  appropriate.  The 




11  For example, in 18 EUs, a company was required to have an independent expert undertake reports on 
specific matters (usually on the company’s compliance arrangements) and in five EUs, specific 
company officers were required to undertake particular education. Independent expert reports 
frequently indicated that the EU had contributed to the company improving its compliance 
arrangements—including improved training, systems, policies and procedures. 
12  These other negotiated outcomes range from entities agreeing to correct misleading advertising to 
more formal arrangements, such as entities agreeing to the imposition of a licence condition. 
13  Stakeholder teams cover compliance risks across various sectors of the financial economy. 
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by  ASIC’s  Enforcement  Committee  and  where  relevant,  approval  by  the 
Commission. However, internal management reporting is currently limited to 
reporting on  the progress of EU negotiations, and more  recently, compliance 
with  undertakings  for  some  EUs.  Improving  reporting  to  include  the 
consistency,  timeliness  and  outcomes  of  EUs  would  better  position  senior 
management in oversighting EUs. 
22. There  is sufficient guidance, on‐the‐job  training and support  for ASIC 
officers  involved  in  the  EU  process.  However,  there  is  scope  for  ASIC  to 
consolidate  the  information  relating  to  EUs  to  reduce  duplication,  improve 
accessibility  and  facilitate  better  internal  and  external  oversight  of  the  EU 
process.14 
23. All  regulators  require  a  sound  performance  measurement  and 
reporting  framework,  and  an  understanding  of  the  costs  of  its  regulatory 
activities. ASIC has  five KPIs  that  relate  to EUs. However  it does not  report 





be  benefit  in  ASIC  more  systematically  collecting  information  covering  the 
costs  of  administering  EUs,  to  help  allocate  its  resources  effectively  and  to 
ensure it is not placing an excessive burden on regulated entities. 
Entering into Enforceable Undertakings (Chapter 3) 
24. To  help  ensure  that  EUs  are  administered  consistently  and 
transparently,  it  is  important  that  they  are  entered  into  in  accordance  with 




14  ASIC’s workflow and document management systems are complex, and information relevant to an EU 
was often held in multiple databases and/or in staff email inboxes. In consolidating the recording of 
information in relation to EUs, a key first step would be to reinforce to staff the need to store all 
documentation relating to an EU in accordance with ASIC policies and procedures. 
15  ASIC does not report externally against the three KPIs; product issuers, credit providers and advisers 
meet required standards: participants in financial markets meet required standards; and issuers (of 
securities) and their officers meet required standards. ASIC reports partially against the two KPIs: fair 
and efficient processes are in place for resolution of disputes; and misconduct is dealt with and 
deterred. 
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reviewed  by  the  ANAO,  senior  management  was  appropriately  involved 
throughout  the  process  and,  for  77 per  cent  of  EUs,  there  was  documented 
approval for the decision to negotiate an EU. However, the format and content 
of  documentation  (including  approvals)  varied  substantially  between  cases 
and there is considerable scope to improve ASIC’s documentation to support a 
more consistent approach to the EU decision‐making and approval process.  
25. For  44  (83 per  cent)  of  the  53 EUs  reviewed,  the documentation was 
sufficient  to  establish  that  the decision  to  accept  an EU—on  the basis  that  it 
would  achieve  an  effective  regulatory  outcome—was  defensible.16  In  these 
cases, the ANAO was able to identify some comparative analysis outlining the 
benefits  of  accepting  an  EU  over  other  regulatory  options  (such  as  court 
action). The most common  justifications for entering into an EU included that 








enable  it  to  have  a  firmer  basis  for  requiring  particular  terms  in EUs,  or  to 
provide  assurance  that  EUs  are  having  the  desired  regulatory  outcome.  In 
addition,  to  improve  its  capacity  to  monitor  compliance  with  EUs  (and  to 
assess  their effectiveness), ASIC could  include reporting requirements  in EUs 
requiring the promisor to provide proof of discharging their obligations. In line 
with  the Senate Economics References Committee’s recommendation,  there  is 
also scope  for ASIC  to ensure  that EUs are clearer about  the misconduct  that 
was  the  subject  of  ASIC’s  concerns.  This  can  be  achieved  by  ASIC  setting 
expectations  about  the  required  content  of  EUs  through  its  policies,  and 
through  consistent  actions  in  requiring  future  EUs  to  include  a  sufficiently 
clear statement about the alleged misconduct. 
27. When  EUs  are  being  finalised,  the  Chief  Legal  Office  is  to  provide 
quality  control  and  assurance. However, while  there was  evidence  of Chief 
Legal  Office  involvement  for  most  EUs  (91  per  cent),  an  approval  was 
                                                     
16  As discussed in footnote 9, in the other seven instances ASIC was able to advise the reasons why 
entering into an EU would provide an effective regulatory outcome. 
Summary 
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documented  in  only  41  per  cent  of  cases.  Also,  while  senior  executives 
ultimately  sign  all  EUs,  final  approvals were  only  recorded  (as  required  by 
ASIC guidance)  in 53 per cent of cases. Accordingly,  there would be merit  in 
ASIC formalising the processes for obtaining approvals for EUs.  
28. ASIC’s policy is that it will issue a media release for each EU and, at its 
discretion, may  give  advance  notice  about  the media  release  to  a  promisor. 
While media releases were published for 52 of the 53 EUs reviewed, there was 
inconsistency  in  ASIC’s  handling  of  requests  from  promisors  for  advance 
copies  of  media  releases.  In  March  2015,  ASIC  advised  that  it  will  be 
introducing a new policy that media releases will generally be provided to all 
promisors that enter into an EU, 24 hours before publication.  
Monitoring Compliance with Enforceable Undertakings (Chapter 4) 
29. To  assess  whether  EUs  achieve  intended  regulatory  outcomes 
(including greater compliance), it is important that ASIC monitors compliance 
by promisors with  these undertakings.17  In  this  regard, ASIC’s monitoring of 
compliance  with  EUs  was  adequate  for  the  significant  majority  of  EUs 
reviewed (83 per cent). In accordance with its risk‐based approach, monitoring 
was  generally  undertaken  consistently,  with  ASIC  having  more  extensive 
ongoing involvement with a promisor where the EU was complex or involved 
ongoing  obligations.  Where  ASIC  had  information  available  suggesting 
non‐compliance with an EU,  it responded appropriately having regard  to  the 
circumstances of the matter.  
30. To  assist  in  monitoring  a  promisor’s  compliance  with  an  EU  and/or 
relevant  laws  following  acceptance  of  an  EU,  ASIC  often  requires  the 
appointment of an independent expert to conduct independent reviews of the 
promisor’s  business. However,  there were  inconsistencies  in  the  process  for 
appointing independent experts under an EU. Of the 30 EUs that required an 
independent expert  to be appointed, 13 did not provide  for ASIC  to approve 
the  expert  and/or  their  terms  of  reference.  Further,  even where  there was  a 
requirement  for  ASIC  to  approve  the  expert,  the  practices  for  this  varied 
considerably between EUs, and there was no documented consideration of the 
appropriateness  of  an  expert  for  one‐third  of  cases  where  an  approval  had 
been  given.  In  four  of  the  10  EUs  reviewed  (40  per  cent)  where  there  was 
                                                     
17  The Senate Economics References Committee raised concerns about the extent to which ASIC 
monitored compliance with EUs. 
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documented  consideration  of  the  appropriateness  of  an  independent  expert, 
ASIC  rejected  the  initial expert proposed by  the promisor. ASIC has  recently 
released  new  public  guidance  that  requires  promisors  to  obtain  ASIC’s 
approval  for  the appointment of an expert and  their  terms of  reference.  It  is 
expected that this will increase consistency over time. 
31. In  general,  reports  produced  by  independent  experts  addressed  EU 
requirements,  were  sufficiently  comprehensive  and  provided  meaningful 





was  evidence  of  ASIC  assessing  the  reports  provided  by  the  expert  and  in 
60 per cent of cases, there was evidence of direct communication by ASIC with 
the expert. However, while  its engagement with experts was effective overall 
(particularly  when  a  stakeholder  team  was  responsible  for  monitoring 
compliance), ASIC  should keep  records of  such engagement and ensure  that 
roles and responsibilities for monitoring are clearly understood. 
32. In  its  report,  the  Senate  Economics  References  Committee 
recommended that ASIC consider ways of making the monitoring of ongoing 
compliance  with  EUs  more  transparent.  In  response,  in  August  2014  ASIC 
introduced draft guidance requiring, as a general position, the public reporting 
of outcomes of EUs  (including  the publication of  summaries of  independent 
expert  reports). ASIC  is currently entering  into EUs consistent with  this new 
policy and anticipates  that by doing  so,  it will effectively address  the Senate 
Economics  References  Committee’s  recommendation.  Nevertheless,  there 
remains scope for ASIC to more systematically assess, and report publicly on, 
the effectiveness of each EU in achieving its desired regulatory outcomes. 
Summary of entity response 
33. ASIC provided the following summary comment to the audit report: 
ASIC  welcomes  the  ANAO  audit  report  on  ASICʹs  administration  of 
enforceable undertakings  and  considers  it provides useful  recommendations 
for improvements in practices. ASIC also welcomes the findings by the ANAO 
that  enforceable  undertakings  have  a  significant  role  to  play  in  ASICʹs 
enforcement  approach, that in general, ASIC has effectively administered the 
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and  actions  regarding  enforceable  undertakings  are  underpinned  by  a 
structured compliance and enforcement approach and that the ANAO did not 
identify any  instances where promisers were  treated differently based on  the 
size of their business are also welcomed by ASIC. 
ASIC  agrees  with  the  two  recommendations  made  in  the  report,  aimed  at 
improving  ASICʹs  measurement  and  reporting  of  the  effectiveness  of 
enforceable undertakings, and at the documentation of key decisions relating 
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an appropriate  regulatory  tool and  their contribution  to 
ASIC  achieving  its  compliance  objectives,  the  ANAO 
recommends that ASIC: 
(a) develops  appropriate  performance  measures  to 
monitor  the  effectiveness  of  enforceable 
undertakings  in  addressing  non‐compliance,  and 
regularly reports against these measures; and 
(b) periodically  assesses,  and  reports  on,  the 
effectiveness  of  enforceable  undertakings  in 










decisions  relating  to enforceable undertakings  to 
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This  chapter  provides  background  information  on ASIC  and  the  use  of  enforceable 
undertakings as a regulatory tool. It also outlines the audit objective and approach. 
Background and context 
1.1 Australia’s  financial  system  plays  an  essential  role  in  supporting  the 
economic  prosperity  of  Australians,  by  providing  consumers  and  businesses 
with banking, investment, superannuation and insurance services. Among other 








1.2 The  Australian  Securities  and  Investments  Commission  (ASIC)  is 
Australia’s  corporate,  financial markets,  financial  services  and  consumer  credit 








strategic priority  broadly  covers  corporate  governance21  and market  integrity, 
                                                     
18  Nominal gross domestic product is a common measure of the size of an economy and refers to the 
total market value of goods and services produced in Australia within a given period. 
19  Reserve Bank of Australia, Statistical Tables: Assets of Financial Institutions, available from 
<www.rba.gov.au/statistics/tables/xls/b01hist.xls> [accessed 16 March 2015]. 
20  ASIC’s other responsibilities include: maintaining publicly accessible registers of information about 
companies, financial services licensees and credit licensees; and administering unclaimed money 
from banking and deposit taking institutions and life insurance institutions. 
21  Corporate governance includes ensuring that: company directors comply with their obligations under the 
Corporations Act 2001; companies comply with requirements in relation to financial reporting; and 
companies comply with requirements in relation to fundraising, takeovers and other corporate transactions. 
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and  involves regulating  the 2.2 million registered companies  in Australia22 and 
supervising  trading  on  Australia’s  domestic  equities,  derivatives  and  futures 
markets. As at 30 June 2014, there were 40 authorised financial markets and six 
licensed clearing and settlement facilities. Australia’s largest financial market is 
the Australian Stock Exchange, one of  the  largest  share markets  in  the world, 
with a domestic equities market capitalisation of $1.57 trillion.23  
Figure 1.1: ASIC’s resource allocation by strategic priority, 2013–14 
  
Source: ASIC Annual Report 2013–14. 
1.4 The  other  significant  area  of  regulation  carried  out  by  ASIC  is  in 
relation  to  investors and  financial consumers,  to which 33 per cent of ASIC’s 
resources  were  directed  in  2013–14.  In  relation  to  investors  and  financial 
consumers, ASIC is responsible for, among other things: 
 monitoring  financial  services  businesses  to  help  ensure  they  operate 
efficiently, honestly and fairly; and 
 ensuring persons who engage  in credit activities meet the standards—
including  their  responsibilities  to  consumers—that  are  set  out  in  the 
National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009. 
                                                     
22  Australian Bureau of Statistics, 8165.0, Counts of Australian Businesses, including Entries and Exits, 
June 2009 to June 2013. 
23  Australian Stock Exchange, Historical market statistics—End of month values, available from 
<http://www.asx.com.au/about/historical-market-statistics.htm#End_of_month_values> [accessed 
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1.5 In 2013–14, ASIC oversaw 3391 Australian  financial  services  licensees 
that  provide  personal  financial  advice,  3673  registered managed  investment 
schemes  and  5837  Australian  credit  licensees.24  The  considerable  resources 
directed  towards  investors  and  other  financial  consumers  reflects  the 
significant  role  that  financial  services  play  in  Australia’s  economy  and  its 
essential contribution to investment, savings and retirement incomes.  
1.6 The  importance  of  effective  financial  regulation  in  Australia  was 
illustrated by  the collapses of Storm Financial and Opes Prime  in 2008–09.  In 
the  case  of  Storm  Financial,  around  3000  of  its  clients,  typically  individuals 
seeking  to generate retirement savings and  income, suffered combined  losses 
of  around  $830  million.  Many  of  these  clients  were  required  to  sell  their 
homes.25 In respect of Opes Prime, a securities lending and stockbroking firm, 




and  ill health.26 There have also been  instances of  inappropriate or predatory 
lending  practices,  which  are  often  targeted  at  vulnerable,  disadvantaged  or 
low‐income consumers.27 
1.7 ASIC’s  compliance  model  is  based  on  a  ‘detect,  understand  and 
respond’ approach.28 Detection occurs  through  surveillance,  reports  from  the 
public  and  whistleblowers,  data  gathering  and  matching,  and  intelligence. 
ASIC  responds  to  non‐compliance,  or  the  risk  of  non‐compliance,  by: 
disrupting harmful behaviour;  taking enforcement action; communicating  the 
                                                     
24  ASIC, Annual Report 2013–14, p. 19. 
25  Senate Economics References Committee, Performance of the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission, p. 504, available from 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Economics/ASIC/Final_Report/~
/media/Committees/Senate/committee/economics_ctte/ASIC/Final_Report/c04.pdf> [accessed 
29 January 2015]. 
26  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Financial products and 
services in Australia, p. 52, available from 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/~/media/wopapub/senate/committee/corporations_ctte/completed_inquiries/20
08_10/fps/report/report_pdf.ashx>  [accessed 12 February 2015]. 
27  Minister for Financial Services and Superannuation, Media Release No 151 of 2011, Protecting 
vulnerable people from inappropriate lending, available from 
<http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2011/151.htm&pageID=003&
min=brs&Year=&DocType=0>  [accessed 17 February 2015]. 
28  ASIC, ASIC’s Strategic Outlook, available from <http://download.asic.gov.au/media/2195181/asic-
strategic-outlook-2014-2015.pdf> [accessed 29 January 2015] 
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actions  it  takes;  educating  investors  and  financial  consumers;  providing 
guidance to ‘gatekeepers’29; and providing policy advice to Government. 
1.8 In  conducting  its  2013–14  regulatory  activities,  35 per  cent  of ASIC’s 
resourcing  was  directed  towards  enforcement  and  20  per  cent  towards 
surveillance  activities.  ASIC’s  surveillance  activity  generally  involves 
monitoring entities to determine whether they are complying with the relevant 
legislation. ASIC adopts a risk‐based approach  to surveillance, which may be 
proactive  or  reactive.  For  example,  ASIC  may  proactively  target  the  largest 
firms  in  a  market  through  site  visits  and  desk‐based  reviews,  or  it  may  be 
reactive,  in  response  to  breach  reports,  or  reports  of  misconduct  from  the 
public and whistleblowers. Where ASIC identifies misconduct as a result of its 
surveillance  activity,  public  or  statutory  reports,  or  referrals  from  another 
regulator,  it  may  take  enforcement  action.  Enforcement  is  one  of  the  many 
regulatory  tools  available  to  ASIC,  and  is  used  to  deter  misconduct. 
Enforcement  includes: taking criminal action (such as seeking  imprisonment); 
commencing civil proceedings (including seeking civil penalty orders); taking 
administrative  action  (such  as  banning  orders  and  imposing  licence 
conditions);  or  accepting  a  negotiated  outcome  (including  an  enforceable 
undertaking). 
Enforceable undertakings 
1.9 An  enforceable  undertaking  (EU)  is  a  written  undertaking,  given  to 
ASIC by a regulated entity, that it will operate in a certain way.30 For example, 
an EU may typically require an entity or an individual (the promisor) to: 
 remedy  the deficiencies  in a company’s compliance systems by  taking 







29  Gatekeepers are individuals or entities who are important in ensuring the health of financial markets, 
and include company directors and officers, financial advisers, credit licensees, insolvency 
practitioners, auditors and liquidators. 
30  Enforceable undertakings are enforceable under statute: Australian Securities and Investments Act 
2001, ss 93AA and 93A; National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009, s 322. 
Introduction 
 
ANAO Report No.38 2014–15 
Administration of Enforceable Undertakings 
 
31 
 perform  a  community  service obligation  (for  example, by  funding  an 
education program for consumers of particular financial services); or 
 write  to  investors or parties affected by misconduct, advising  them of 
the existence of the EU, its terms and how a copy of it can be obtained.31 
1.10 EUs  are used  as  an  alternative  to  civil  court  action  or  administrative 
actions  (such  as  banning  orders,  imposing  licence  conditions,  or  issuing  an 
infringement notice). In comparison to these, EUs provide a tailored and more 
certain  outcome  that  can,  for  example,  involve  entities  making  substantial 
changes  to  their  systems  and  cultures  and,  in  appropriate  cases,  making 
restitution.  EUs  may  be  preferred  to  civil  action  as  the  latter  is  usually 
lengthier  and  the  outcome  is  uncertain.  Administrative  actions  such  as 




1.11 ASIC  is able  to accept EUs  from  individuals and  corporations and  in 
respect of any area where ASIC has regulatory responsibility.33 ASIC considers 







31  ASIC, Regulatory Guide 100: Enforceable Undertakings, February 2015, Table 3, pp. 12–13. 
32  An exception is where the acceptance of an EU best serves an urgent protective purpose and is not 
an impediment to later court action. A detailed comparison of EUs with other regulatory options is at 
Table 2.2 in Chapter 2. 
33  See s 93AA and s 93A of the Australian Securities and Investments Act 2001. In relation to consumer 
credit related matters, the power is provided by s 322 of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 
2009. The law envisages that the entity that has committed the suspected misconduct will make an 
offer to ASIC to enter into an EU, and ASIC then considers whether to accept the offer. ASIC cannot 
require an entity to enter into an EU, and an entity cannot compel ASIC to accept an EU. Either ASIC 
or the promisor can initiate negotiations to enter into an EU.  
34  ASIC, Regulatory Guide 100: Enforceable Undertakings, February 2015, p. 5. 
35  Johnstone R and Parker C, Enforceable Undertakings in Action: Report of a Roundtable Discussion 
with Australian Regulators, available from 
<http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/files/dmfile/ParkerandJohnstoneEnforceableUndertakingsinActionRep
ortofaRoundtableDiscussionwithAustralianRegulatorsFinalEUWorkingPaper17Feb20101.pdf> 
[accessed 31 October 2014].  
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result  of  the  breach.  Failure  to  comply with  such  an  order  is  a  contempt  of 
court. 
ASIC’s use of enforceable undertakings 
1.13 ASIC’s  use  of  EUs  in  the  context  of  its  other  enforcement  activities 
covering the period 1 January 2012 to 30 June 2014 is outlined in Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1: ASIC enforcement outcomes, 1 January 2012 to 


















29 4 38 4 0 75 
Corporate 
Governance 
24 9 11 16 1 61 
Financial 
services 






1 105(3) 2 165 0 0 1 272 
Total 1 198 56 354 97 6 1 711 
Source: ASIC, Report 383: ASIC enforcement outcomes: July to December 2013 and ASIC, Report 402: 
ASIC enforcement outcomes: January to June 2014. 
Note: ASIC reports outcomes per defendant, rather than per matter. 
Note 1: Civil outcomes include declarations, injunctions and civil penalty orders.  
Note 2: The figure for EUs also includes other negotiated outcomes. An example of an ‘other 
negotiated outcome’ is where ASIC negotiated with a home loan lender to have the lender 
refund early termination fees paid by consumers in breach of the relevant consumer credit 
law. ASIC’s publicly available enforcement statistics do not separate EUs from other 
negotiated outcomes. 
Note 3: The large number of criminal convictions arising from small business compliance and 
deterrence activities reflects the high-volume investigative activities of ASIC’s Small Business 
Compliance and Deterrence team. These activities include: taking action against directors who 
fail to assist liquidators when their companies fail; investigating and banning directors; and 
preparing criminal briefs for matters including breaches of director’s duties, managing while 
disqualified, lodging false documents and failing to lodge financial statements. 
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1.14 Table  1.1  combines  EUs  and  negotiated  outcomes.  To  determine  the 
number and nature of EUs entered  into  from 1  January 2012  to 30 June 2014, 
the Australian National Audit Office  (ANAO) examined ASIC’s EUs register, 
available on its website (Table 1.2). 
Table 1.2: Number and nature of enforceable undertakings entered 
into by ASIC, 1 January 2012 to 30 June 2014 























































2012 18   2   0 16   7   7   2 2 
2013 25   7   8 10   3 12   8 2 
2014(3) 10   1     5(4)     5(4)   3   3   3 1 
Total 53 10 13 31 13 22 13 5 
Source: ANAO analysis. 
Note 1: The Australian Bureau of Statistics definition of a large business is used—that is, one with 200 or 
more employees. 
Note 2: Includes two EUs relating to influencing the Bank Bill Swap Rate, one EU relating to a breach of 
continuous disclosure obligations, one EU relating to corporate governance and one EU involving 
market misconduct.  
Note 3: These figures are for the half year to June 2014. A further 13 EUs were accepted by ASIC in the 
period 1 July 2014 to 31 December 2014. 
Note 4: The figures for EUs by entity size in 2014 add to 11 (rather than 10) because one EU accepted 
during the year involved both small companies and individuals associated with those companies. 
1.15 From July 1998 (when EUs were introduced) to December 2014, a total of 
388 EUs  were  accepted  by  ASIC  (an  average  of  24  annually)  and  from 
January 2010  to  December  2014,  92  EUs  were  accepted  (an  average  of 
18 annually). Table 1.2 shows that in 2013 and the first half of 2014, ASIC entered 
into more EUs with  companies  than with  individuals.  In  this period,  the EUs 
also related to comparatively more credit and financial services matters.  
Parliamentary and other external scrutiny of ASIC 
1.16 In June 2013, the Senate referred the performance of ASIC to the Senate 
Economics References Committee  for  inquiry. The  terms of  reference  for  the 
inquiry were:  
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 ASICʹs  enabling  legislation,  and  whether  there  are  any  barriers 
preventing  ASIC  from  fulfilling  its  legislative  responsibilities  and 
obligations;  
 the  accountability  framework  to which ASIC  is  subject,  and whether 
this needs to be strengthened;  
 the  workings  of  ASICʹs  collaboration  and  relationships  with  other 
regulators and law enforcement bodies; 
 ASICʹs complaints management policies and practices;  




26  June  2014.  One  area  of  focus  for  the  Committee  was  the  allegations  of 
serious  misconduct  engaged  in  by  financial  advisers  at  Commonwealth 
Financial  Planning  Limited  (part  of  the  Commonwealth  Bank  of  Australia 
Group) between 2006 and 2010. The chair of the Committee stated that ASICʹs 
slow response to the case and lack of scepticism was hard to explain, and that 
the agency  ‘allowed  itself to be  lulled  into complacency and placed too much 
trust in an institution that sought to patch over its problems.’ He added that: 
The  good work  that ASIC has done  in  a  challenging  environment has  been 
recognised. Even so, there is a need for ASIC to become a far more proactive 
regulator ready to act promptly but fairly. ASIC also needs to be a harsh critic 
of  its  own  performance  with  the  drive  to  identify  and  implement 
improvements.37 
1.18 The Committee made 61 recommendations generally aimed at enabling 
ASIC  to  fulfil  its  responsibilities  and  obligations  more  effectively  and  to 
promote  greater  confidence  in  the  regulator.  The  Committee  also  raised 
concerns about ASIC’s enforcement decisions, and particularly, its use of EUs. 
Potential  issues  regarding  ASIC’s  EU  processes  and  practices  raised  in 
submissions and highlighted by the Committee included: 
                                                     
36  Senate Economics References Committee, Performance of the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission, p. 3. 
37  Senate Economics References Committee, Media Release: ASIC Inquiry final report says Royal 
Commission is warranted, 26 June 2014. 
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 the  extent  of  ASIC’s  reliance  on  EUs,  particularly  as  a  remedy  for 
misconduct by  large entities—the Committee quoted submissions  that 
suspected ASIC might have been ‘soft on the big end of town’; 
 the  clarity  of  EUs  in  specifying  remedial  actions  and  whether  the 
undertakings placed  sufficient  conditions on  entities whose  strategies 
may be damaging financial consumers and investors; 





 scope  to  improve  transparency  in  relation  to  the monitoring  of  EUs, 
such  as  through  making  publicly  available  the  reports  provided  to 
ASIC  by  independent  experts  appointed  as  a  condition  of  the 
undertaking.38  
1.19 As a consequence of  these concerns,  the Senate Economics References 
Committee  included  in  its report a recommendation that the Auditor‐General 
consider conducting a performance audit of ASIC’s use of EUs, including: 
 the  consistency  of  ASICʹs  approach  to  EUs  across  its  various 
stakeholder and enforcement teams39; and 
 the  arrangements  in  place  for  monitoring  compliance  with  EUs  that 
ASIC has accepted. 




person  offering  the  EU  to  implement  significant  changes  to  the  way  they 
operate,  and  to  provide  substantial  compensation,  conditions  that  may  be 
                                                     
38  If the EU contains ongoing obligations, ASIC needs to ensure that the entity’s compliance is 
monitored. Often, EUs will stipulate that independent experts will be appointed by the promisor to 
undertake this monitoring.  
39  ASIC’s stakeholder teams cover compliance risks across various sectors of the financial economy. 
ASIC’s enforcement teams are generally responsible for undertaking investigations and initiating 
enforcement actions. 
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Previous ANAO coverage of ASIC 
1.22 The ANAO has undertaken  the  following  two performance  audits of 
ASIC, tabled in 2006 and 2007:  





1.23 An  element  of  ASIC’s  registry  functions  was  also  included  in  the 
cross‐agency  audit  of  the  Administration  of  the  Australian  Business  Register, 
which  was  tabled  in  June  2014.  None  of  these  reports  covered  ASIC’s 
administration of EUs. 
Audit objective, criteria and methodology 
1.24 The  objective  of  the  audit  was  to  assess  the  effectiveness  of  the 




 management  arrangements  are  in  place  that  support  the  effective, 
consistent and transparent administration of EUs; 






40  ASIC, Opening statement, Senate Economics References Committee Inquiry into the performance of 
ASIC, 19 February 2014, available from <http://www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=b43214c6-
1b13-4050-b964-5e62192ddfa2> [accessed 27 January 2015]. 
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1.26 The audit examined ASIC’s use of EUs as a  regulatory  tool across all 
stakeholder and enforcement teams involved in administering EUs. The audit 
examined  all  53  EUs  that  were  accepted  by  ASIC  from  1 January 2012  to 
30 June 2014. 








Table 1.3: Structure of the report 
Chapter Overview of chapter 
2 Managing Enforceable 
Undertakings 
Examines ASIC’s arrangements to support the 
administration of enforceable undertakings. 
3 Entering into Enforceable 
Undertakings 
Examines whether ASIC enters into enforceable 
undertakings consistently, transparently and in 
accordance with its own policies and procedures. 
4 Monitoring Compliance with 
Enforceable Undertakings 
Examines ASIC’s monitoring of enforceable 
undertakings, action taken to address non-compliance, 
and reporting on compliance with the undertakings. 
                                                     
41  The ANAO consulted with the Australian Restructuring Insolvency and Turnaround Association, 
Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand, the Consumer Action Law Centre, the Financial 
Rights Legal Centre and the GRC Institute. The ANAO also interviewed independent experts and 
academics. 
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2. Managing Enforceable Undertakings 




to meet  their  legislative and regulatory responsibilities and  to be accountable 
for  their  decisions,  actions  and  performance.42  Regulators  also  need  a 
risk‐based  compliance  and  enforcement  approach  that  communicates 




 management  arrangements,  including  for  the  oversight  and  quality 
control of EUs; 
 performance monitoring and reporting processes; and 
 guidance  and  training  arrangements  that  support  ASIC  officers 
involved in negotiating and monitoring compliance with EUs. 
Compliance and enforcement approach 
2.3 Regulators should have a compliance and enforcement approach that is 
risk‐based  and  proportionate,  and  that  supports  consistency,  accountability 






42  ANAO Better Practice Guide, Administering Regulation, June 2014, p. 13, available from 
<http://www.anao.gov.au/~/media/Files/Better%20Practice%20Guides/2013%202014/ANAO%20-
%20BPG%20Administering%20Regulation.pdf> [accessed 30 October 2014]. 
43  Productivity Commission, Regulator Audit Framework, March 2014, p. 25, available from 
<http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/134780/regulator-audit-framework.pdf> [accessed 
12 December 2014]. 
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Figure 2.1: ASIC’s approach to non-compliance 
 
Source: ANAO, based on ASIC information. 
Detecting and understanding misconduct or the risk of misconduct 
2.5 ASIC detects misconduct or the risk of misconduct (including potential 




ASIC  identifies, analyses and evaluates risks  in  the regulated population and 
focuses  surveillance  activities46  on  those  areas  it  considers  to  be  the  highest 
risk. This program sits alongside reactive surveillance work, which arises from 
reports from whistleblowers, complaints from the public or breach reports.47 A 
key  focus  for  ASIC  is  detecting  and  understanding  the  drivers  of  risks  to 
investors,  financial  consumers,  and  the  sectors  and  participants  that  it 
regulates. 
Responding to misconduct or the risk of misconduct 




44  ASIC Media Release, <http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/byheadline/11-202MR+ASIC+reports+on+ 
phase+one+review+of+financial+advice+industry+practice?openDocument> [accessed 6 June 2014]. 
45  Annual business planning processes require ASIC management to develop business plans that deliver 
ASIC’s strategic priorities. Risks that could impact on the delivery of these priorities are recorded and 
assessed as part of ASIC’s risk management framework and processes. ASIC has broad processes 
for identifying and prioritising strategic risks. 
46  ASIC undertakes surveillance to assess compliance with the laws that it administers. Surveillance may 
be desk-based (such as assessing the advertising material of regulated entities) or on-site (including 
assessing the records and client files of entities). 
47  Australian financial services licensees, and company auditors and liquidators are required to submit 
reports notifying ASIC of breaches in specified circumstances. 
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Table 2.1: ASIC’s responses to misconduct or the risk of misconduct 
Response Explanation 
Communication ASIC communicates the actions it takes to promote compliance with the 
law by informing the public about the standards it expects and the 
consequences of failing to meet those standards. Examples include 
media releases reporting ASIC’s compliance activities and corporate 
publications (such as ASIC’s Strategic Outlook). 
Education ASIC helps investors and financial investors and consumers make 
appropriate choices when they deal with money and financial products 
and services through its MoneySmart website and Indigenous Outreach 
Program. 
Enforcement ASIC takes a range of actions (including administrative, civil and criminal 
action) to enforce the law and deal with misconduct that puts investors 




ASIC engages with industry and stakeholders to assist regulated entities 
to meet their obligations under Australian law, and to detect misconduct, 
by gathering intelligence and understanding market and consumer 
behaviour. In 2013–14, ASIC held 1172 meetings with industry groups 
and other stakeholders. 
Policy advice ASIC provides policy advice to Government on law reform that might be 
required to overcome problems that it encounters in administering or 




ASIC issues regulatory guides and information papers to assist 
regulated entities in complying with the law. This guidance explains 
when and how ASIC will exercise specific powers, how it interprets the 
law and provides practical guidance for entities (such as outlining the 
process for applying for a licence or giving practical examples about how 
regulated entities may decide to meet their obligations).  





their  obligations’.48  Further,  Information  Sheet  172:  Cooperating  with  ASIC 
encourages  entities  to  cooperate  with  ASIC,  including  by  self‐reporting 
misconduct.49 As outlined  in Table  2.1, where ASIC  identifies misconduct,  it 
may take enforcement action in respect of that conduct. 
                                                     
48  ASIC, Corporate compliance, available from <http://asic.gov.au/for-business/running-a-
company/company-officeholder-duties/corporate-compliance> [accessed 30 January 2015]. 
49  ASIC, Information Sheet 172, available from <http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/asic-investigations-and-
enforcement/cooperating-with-asic> [accessed 29 January 2015]. 
Managing Enforceable Undertakings 
 
ANAO Report No.38 2014–15 





ASIC’s  approach  to  enforcement,  which  is  available  on  its  website.50  This 
information  sheet  covers  the  range  of  regulatory  tools  that ASIC  can use  to 
improve  confidence  in  Australia’s  financial  markets  and  facilitate  fair  and 
efficient  markets.  These  tools  include  education,  engagement  and  guidance, 
and  using  its  enforcement  powers  such  as  criminal  and  civil  sanctions, 
administrative  remedies  and  negotiated  outcomes,  depending  on  the 
seriousness and consequences of the misconduct. 
2.9 ASIC’s  approach  to  enforcement  is  similar  to  the  commonly‐used 
‘regulatory pyramid’ compliance model. The model involves the less frequent 
use  of  the  most  severe  sanctions,  which  form  the  apex  of  the  pyramid, 




comply  with  the  law.  Where  the  conduct  is  less  serious  and  the  regulated 
entity  is co‐operative,  the model  identifies more moderate sanctions as being 
appropriate.  ASIC  advised  that  it  sees  EUs  as  normally  sitting  towards  the 
bottom of the compliance pyramid, although this will depend on the content of 
a particular EU. 






50  ASIC, Information Sheet 151, available from <http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/asic-investigations-and-
enforcement/asic-s-approach-to-enforcement> [accessed 16 December 2014]. 
51  Senate Economics References Committee, Performance of the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission, available from 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Economics/ASIC/Final_Report/~
/media/Committees/Senate/committee/economics_ctte/ASIC/Final_Report/c04.pdf> [accessed 
21 November 2014]. 
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Figure 2.2: ASIC’s approach to enforcement 
 
Source: ASIC Information Sheet 151: ASIC’s approach to enforcement. 
Role of enforceable undertakings 
2.11 In  terms  of  EUs,  the  role  of  these  regulatory  tools  in  ASIC’s 
enforcement  approach  is outlined  in ASIC’s Regulatory Guide  100: Enforceable 
Undertakings.  According  to  this  guide,  ASIC  views  EUs:  ‘as  an  important 
component  in  [its] array of enforcement remedies  to  influence behaviour and 
encourage  a  culture  of  compliance  for  the  benefit  of  all  participants’. 
Importantly,  ASIC  considers:  ‘that  an  [EU]  can  sometimes  offer  a  more 
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2.12 Before  deciding  whether  to  accept  an  EU,  ASIC  will  have  already 
undertaken  a  number  of  compliance  actions,  including  conducting  a 
surveillance activity and/or an  initial  investigation of  the  regulated entity. A 
decision  is  then  taken whether  to conduct a  formal  investigation, based on a 
consideration of the matter’s strategic significance (including the seriousness of 
the misconduct, its impact on the market, and the likelihood and consequences 
of  the  conduct  causing  harm  to  investors  and  others)  and  the  benefits  of 
pursuing the misconduct. 
2.13 If a breach is established and enforcement action is justified, ASIC may 
consider  accepting  an  EU  from  among  the  enforcement  tools  available 
(outlined  in the following section). This consideration  involves an assessment 




liquidator  agreeing  not  to  practice  for  three  years,  this may  be  preferred  to 
Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board proceedings, where 
an outcome  is uncertain and ASIC might have  judged  the  likely outcome as 
being a ban of between two and four years.54  
Alternatives to enforceable undertakings 





52  ASIC, Regulatory Guide 100: Enforceable Undertakings, February 2015, paragraphs RG100.6 and 
RG100.7, available from <http://download.asic.gov.au/media/2976014/rg100-published-19-february-
2015.pdf> [accessed 24 February 2015]. 
53  ibid, paragraphs RG100.20 and RG100.26(g). 
54  Chapter 3 examines the practical implementation of this approach, that is, whether EUs have been 
entered into on the basis they will achieve an effective regulatory outcome. The ANAO examined 
53 EUs that were accepted by ASIC between 1 January 2012 and 30 June 2014. 
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Table 2.2: Regulatory alternatives to enforceable undertakings 
Type of sanction Effectiveness Transparency Consequences 




Can protect the public by 
excluding an entity from 
the industry in a 
relatively timely manner, 
or imposing conditions 
on the way in which they 
operate. There are a 
wide-range of conditions 
that can be imposed. 
The result is public, 
as details about any 
licence cancellations 







result in exclusion of 
the entity from the 
industry. The effect 
of licence conditions 
will depend on the 





Can protect the public by 
resulting in the exclusion 
of an entity from the 
industry in a relatively 
timely manner. 
The result is public, 
as the person is 
placed on a register 
of banned or 
disqualified persons. 








May not change the 
entity’s culture (that is, it 
can be seen as a ‘cost of 
doing business’). 
Legislation does not 
provide infringement 
notice powers for some 
types of misconduct. 
The result is public, 
as details are placed 
on an infringement 





differing levels of 
penalty.  
Court action (civil or criminal action) 
Civil action (civil 
penalties and/or 





Quantum of a civil 
penalty may not provide 
strong deterrence or 
result in behavioural 
change. Can achieve 
outcomes that result in 
the remediation of 
consumers/investors. 
Publicity of outcome may 
have strong deterrence 
impact. 
The result is public 
as a court imposes a 
penalty (and ASIC 
issues a media 
release). 




2001, the maximum 
civil penalty is 
$200 000 for 
individuals and 
$1 million for 
corporations. 
Compensation 
orders are also 
possible. 
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Type of sanction Effectiveness Transparency Consequences 
Court action (civil or criminal action) (continued) 
Criminal action Can protect the public by 
resulting in the 
imprisonment of a 
person. Criminal action 
can have a very strong 
deterrence impact; 
however, charges can 
take a long time to be 
heard by a court. 
The result is public 
as a court imposes a 
penalty (and ASIC 
issues a media 
release). 
Depend on the 
offence. Prison 
terms of up to 
10 years; or fines up 
to $765 000 for 
individuals or 
$7.7 million for 
companies, or three 
times the benefit 
gained. 




Can protect the public by 
resulting in the 
temporary or permanent 
exclusion of a person 
from the industry. The 
Companies Auditors and 
Liquidators Disciplinary 
Board can also make 
other orders (such as 
requiring a person to 
undertake education) to 
reduce the possibility of 
reoffending. 
Proceedings are in 
private unless and 
until an adverse 
finding is made. 
May cancel 
registration or 
suspend for a 
specified period of 
time. May also 
obtain an EU, or 
admonish or 
reprimand.  
Other negotiated outcomes 
Examples include 









These are highly flexible, 
and due to the 
informality, can be 
achievable in a relatively 
short timeframe. These 
undertakings might not 
be court enforceable. 
Negotiated in private, 
but normally 
publicised in a media 
release. There is 
currently no formal 
ASIC policy, 
definition or public 
register. 
Vary depending on 
the terms of the 
agreement. 




disadvantages. A potential benefit of EUs  is  in driving changes  in an entity’s 
culture  and  systems,  whereas  an  administrative  penalty,  or  even  a  civil 
sanction,  may  not  lead  to  behavioural  change.  Recognising  this  benefit,  the 
Senate  Economics  References  Committee  concluded  that  EUs  may  correct 
behaviour within a particular organisation, but added that these undertakings 
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‘do  not  yield  the  wider  and  more  significant  regulatory  benefits  that  are 
associated with  successful  court  action’.55 While  a  favourable  court  decision 
may  have  a  greater  general  deterrent  effect  than  an  EU,  as  indicated  in  
Table 2.2,  the outcome of  court action  is uncertain  in  terms of  the  sanction56 
that a court might impose and the consequential effect on the entity’s business 
(such as improved compliance processes). During the period 1 January 2012 to 
30  June 2014, as outlined  in Table 1.1,  there were a  total of 1711 enforcement 
outcomes, of which 97 were EUs or other negotiated outcomes. 
Other negotiated outcomes 
2.16 As  mentioned  in  Chapter  1,  ASIC  sometimes  reaches  negotiated 
outcomes  with  regulated  entities  that  are  not  EUs  (that  is,  they  are  not 
enforceable by statute, although they may be enforceable as a contract). These 
types of outcomes are used across a variety of matters. At the lower end, ASIC 
negotiates outcomes  that  involve,  for example, an exchange of  letters  leading 
to  the  correction  of  misleading  or  deceptive  conduct.  At  the  higher  end,  a 
negotiated  outcome may  be  similar  to  an  EU. While  these  other  negotiated 
outcomes can be quite significant, ASIC does not have a policy, definition or 
public  register  for  this  type  of  activity.  There  can  also  be  less  clarity  about 
announcing the terms of the settlement.57  
2.17 Based on  information provided by ASIC,  the ANAO  identified  that  in 
2013–14, ASIC  finalised at  least 113 negotiated outcomes other  than an EU.58 
However, given  that ASIC does not have a policy, clear definitions or public 
register in relation to negotiated outcomes, these numbers are not exhaustive, 
and  there are  likely  to be additional outcomes  resolved  through negotiations 
by  the  stakeholder  and  enforcement  teams.  To  give  regulated  entities more 
                                                     
55  Senate Economics References Committee, Performance of the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission, available from 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Economics/ASIC/Final_Report/~
/media/Committees/Senate/committee/economics_ctte/ASIC/Final_Report/report.pdf> [accessed 
12 November 2014], paragraph 17.47. 
56  In its submission to the 2014 Financial System Inquiry, ASIC raised concerns that the available 
regulatory tools and penalties may not be sufficient to operate as a genuine deterrent to misconduct. 
ASIC, Financial System Inquiry: Submission by the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission, available from <http://fsi.gov.au/files/2014/04/ASIC.pdf> [accessed 10 November 2014]. 
57  While ASIC advised that, as a matter of practice, such outcomes are announced in a media release, 
the ANAO identified one instance where this did not occur. 
58  These other negotiated outcomes included: 91 involving the correction of misleading or deceptive 
information (usually following a letter sent by ASIC to the entity); and 12 resulting in compensation or 
refunds to consumers. 
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greater  clarity  around  the  circumstances  in which  it  accepts  and  enters  into 
other negotiated outcomes.  
Management arrangements for enforceable undertakings 
2.18 To help ensure that regulatory decisions (including for the use of EUs) 
are made consistently,  transparently and proportionately,  it  is  important  that 
sound  management  arrangements  are  in  place.  Accordingly,  the  ANAO 
examined ASIC’s management arrangements for EUs. 
2.19 As  previously  discussed,  ASIC  may  become  aware  of  a  potential 
enforcement  matter  in  a  number  of  ways,  including  through  reporting  of 
misconduct and breaches. These matters can be referred  to  the relevant ASIC 
stakeholder  team  for  further  review  or  directed  to  an  enforcement  team  to 
consider undertaking an investigation or initiating enforcement action.59 
2.20 Depending  on  the  nature  of  the  EU,  staff  from  the  enforcement  and 
stakeholder teams will have varying degrees of involvement. EUs are generally 
negotiated  and  finalised  by  enforcement  teams,  which  will  also  undertake 
monitoring if prompt follow‐up action is required (for example, a community 
benefit payment must be made by a certain date). Otherwise, the stakeholder 
team,  which  is  better  placed  to  have  an  ongoing  relationship  with  the 
promisor, monitors  the EU. The  relevant stakeholder and enforcement  teams 
are expected to liaise with each other as necessary, for example to ensure that 
an EU contains appropriate  terms and  that  the promises given will  take  into 
account  the position of  those affected by  the alleged breaches.  In practice, as 
discussed in paragraphs 4.12 to 4.14, the respective teams generally did consult 
as required. 
Roles of senior executives and executive committees 
2.21 According to ASIC guidance, a Senior Executive Leader (SEL)60 must be 
consulted before ASIC enters into negotiations for a possible EU, and generally 
approves  the EU. As at November 2014,  there were 21 SELs  (and  two Senior 
                                                     
59  As outlined in Chapter 1, stakeholder teams consider compliance risks across the various finance 
market segments, while enforcement teams are generally responsible for investigations and 
enforcement actions. 
60  An SEL is an ASIC senior executive officer who reports directly to an ASIC Commissioner. In most 
cases, each enforcement and stakeholder team is headed by a SEL.  
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Executives), whose  roles  included  considering  and  approving EUs.61  For  the 
53 EUs reviewed by  the ANAO, all were  formally approved and signed by a 
SEL or a Senior Executive.  
2.22 To  support  SELs,  ASIC  has  an  Enforcement  Committee  that  makes 
decisions about  the conduct,  strategy and  focus of major compliance matters 
and  other  significant  enforcement  actions, which  can  include EUs.62 Records 
indicate  that  the Committee  has  considered  aspects  of  the  administration  of 
EUs, including the current status and whether an EU was being considered for, 
or  had  been  concluded  with,  an  entity.63  There  were  also  action  items  and 
matters  carried  forward  (with  due  dates  and  persons  responsible),  and  a 
record of the Committee’s decisions. 
2.23 The Office of the Chief Legal Office (CLO) provides legal, strategic and 
other  input  into  major  compliance  cases,  and  assists  enforcement  and 
stakeholder teams. In relation to EUs, the CLO is responsible for the policy and 
procedures, and  is required  to provide assurance about drafting clarity,  legal 
certainty,  enforceability  and  compliance  with  ASIC  policies  before  ASIC 
accepts each EU. As discussed in Chapter 3, for most of the 53 cases examined 
by the ANAO, there was evidence of the CLO’s involvement in the EU process. 
Internal monitoring and reporting of enforceable undertakings 
2.24 Accurate performance reporting should  inform ASIC senior managers 
of  the  extent  to  which  regulatory  objectives  are  being  met  and  support 
management decision‐making. In  the case of EUs,  it was expected  that senior 
executives  would  track  these  in  a  systematic  way  to  monitor  how  long 
negotiations  are  taking, what outcomes  they are  achieving,  and  if  they have 
been effective in changing behaviours. 
Internal monitoring and reporting of EU negotiations 
2.25 Prior  to  acceptance  of  an EU,  each  stakeholder  and  enforcement  team 
reports on the progress of the EU negotiation as part of their regular fortnightly 
and monthly  reports. The  reports provide a  summary of developments  in  the 
                                                     
61  ASIC, ASIC senior executives, available from <http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/what-we-do/our-
structure/asic-senior-executives/asic-senior-executives-biographies> [accessed 23 January 2015].  
62  If the matter is particularly high profile, controversial or otherwise major, it may also need to be 
submitted to the ASIC Commission for consideration, discussion and potential decision. 
63  For these meetings, a table is circulated to attendees listing all current major matters and outlining the 
current status of the matter.  
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cases being addressed by each  team,  including EUs.64 With respect  to EUs,  the 
reports provide an update on the status of negotiations and any problem areas. 
However,  the  reports do not document  senior management consideration and 
feedback  (if  any)  regarding  the  progress  of  matters  or  suggested  changes  of 
approach.  It  would  be  helpful  if  reporting  also  focused  on  matters  such  as 
timeliness, obstacles faced or issues that have arisen in negotiations with entities, 
and shareing better practices where appropriate across teams. 
Internal monitoring and reporting of EU compliance 
2.26 It is important that there is appropriate oversight and accountability by 




the spreadsheet provides useful  information  for  the Commission65,  it covered 
only around half of the EUs reviewed as part of the audit, and was limited to 
EUs  involving  ongoing  positive  obligations  (undertakings  to  do  or 
performance a certain act). To  improve senior management visibility over the 
administration  of  EUs,  further  work  could  be  undertaken  to  consider  the 
coverage of EUs in the CLO report.  
2.28 Overall,  internal reporting on EUs  is currently  limited  to reporting on 
the  progress  of  EU  negotiations,  and  more  recently  compliance  with 
undertakings  for  some  EUs.  To  reflect  better  practice  and  support  senior 
management  oversight  of  EUs,  there  would  be  merit  in  ASIC  improving 
internal reporting to provide a greater focus on timeliness of EU negotiations, 
and consistency in approaches between stakeholder and enforcement teams.  
Guidance, systems and training 




64  The ANAO reviewed the fortnightly and monthly reports for the period January 2012 to June 2014. 
65  The information contained in the spreadsheet included the name of the party, the concerns that were 
the subject of the EU, the team responsible for the EU and the current monitoring status. While there 
was information regarding the outcomes of the monitoring activities for some EUs, this information was 
not provided consistently. 
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credit  legislation).  These  provisions  are  broadly  drafted  and  provide  ASIC 
with discretion to exercise this authority.  
2.31 Given  the  lack of specificity  in  these Acts,  it  is  important  for ASIC  to 
issue  guidance  on  how  it  exercises  its  authority,  to  support  consistent 
decision‐making  processes  and  provide  transparency  about  the  criteria  on 
which  decisions  will  be  based.  ASIC  uses  a  range  of  public  and  internal 
guidance  documents  to  explain  how  it  administers  EUs.  The  key  public 
guidance  document  is  Regulatory  Guide  100,  which  was  last  updated  in 







its policy, but which  it  is  required by  law  to  take  into account  in making  its 
decision. For example, ASIC’s policy states that it will not normally accept an 
EU in which the promisor does not at least acknowledge that ASIC’s views in 
relation  to  the  misconduct  which  gave  rise  to  the  EU  are  reasonably  held. 
However,  in eight cases, ASIC did not  insist on an acknowledgement clause, 
generally because an EU without  such a  clause was  still viewed as  the most 
effective regulatory outcome in the matter. 
2.33 There are a number of public documents  that  further  support ASIC’s 
EU policy: a policy on public comment, which outlines that it will usually issue 
a media  release  or media  advisory when  it  accepts EUs  and  agreements  by 
people to change their conduct67; and a policy on cooperation, that states that 
cooperation  will  be  relevant  to  ASICʹs  decision  on  the  type  of  enforcement 
                                                     
66  ASIC, Regulatory Guide 100: Enforceable Undertakings, February 2015. 
67  ASIC Information Sheet 152, Public comment, available from <http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/asic-
investigations-and-enforcement/public-comment/> [accessed 17 December 2014]. 
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EUs  that  sets  out  the  process  by  which  ASIC  will  enter  into  an  EU.  As 







2.36 Stakeholders  and  ASIC  staff  interviewed  by  the  ANAO  during  the 
audit  raised  few  concerns  about  their  ability  to  apply  ASIC’s  guidance. 
However,  some  stakeholders  suggested  there  could  be  more  guidance 
provided  regarding  the  appointment  of,  and  ASIC’s  expectations  for, 
independent  experts  (discussed  in  Chapter  4).  In  relation  to  independent 
experts,  these  concerns  have  been  largely  addressed  by  the publication  of  a 
revised Regulatory Guide 100 in February 2015. 
Records management systems 
2.37 The recording of regulatory actions and the reasons for these actions is 
important  for  both  transparency  and  accountability.70  Consistent  with  these 
principles, ASIC’s internal Governance Protocol states that: ‘record keeping in 
relation  to  all  matters,  should  be  comprehensive,  orderly  and  readily 
accessible’.71 
                                                     
68  ASIC Information Sheet 172, Cooperating with ASIC, available from <http://asic.gov.au/about-
asic/asic-investigations-and-enforcement/cooperating-with-asic/> [accessed 17 December 2014]. 
69  ASIC Service Charter, September 2012, available from <http://www.asic.gov.au/servicecharter> 
[accessed 16 October 2014]. 
70  ANAO Better Practice Guide, Administering Regulation, p. 21. 
71  The Governance Protocol describes the governance principles for investigations, including when the 
Commission is to be involved in decisions about EUs. 
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 Search  tools—ASCertain  (a  mainframe  system)  and  the  data 
warehouse search tool (a web‐based system) allow ASIC staff to search 
across  the data holdings  in ASIC’s mainframe  systems and workflow 
systems to research companies and individuals of interest.  
 Registers—ASCOT is a mainframe system that is ASIC’s main registry 
system.  It  contains  details  about  registered  companies,  persons 
associated with  companies  (such as directors), as well as professional 






 Document  management—The  main  systems  for  recording 
documentation  are  ASIC’s  paper  files  (centrally  tracked  through  the 
EPSOM  system)  and  ASIC’s  electronic  documents  and  records 
management system, ECM. In addition, the ANAO identified that ASIC 
staff  also  stored  files  in  the workflow  systems  (referred  to  above),  in 
staff emails or hard files, and in shared drives. 
2.39 It was common for information relevant to an EU to be held in multiple 
systems  (ECM,  paper  files  and  a  workflow  system).  In  many  cases,  these 
systems did not have all of the information relating to the EU and the ANAO 
had  to  obtain  the  documentation  from  the  relevant ASIC  officer  (from  staff 
emails  or  hard  files). This presents  risks  for ASIC,  as  staff  responsible  for  a 
certain part  of  the EU process  (such  as monitoring) may not have  sufficient 
information  to  effectively  carry  out  their  responsibilities,  particularly  as 
matters often need to be handed over from stakeholder to enforcement teams, 
and  vice  versa.  Accordingly,  there  would  be  value  in  consolidating 
information  relating  to EUs  to  reduce duplication,  improve  accessibility  and 
facilitate better  internal and external oversight of  the EU process. A key  first 
step would be to reinforce to staff the need to store all documentation relating 
to an EU in accordance with ASIC policies and procedures.  
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2.40 ASIC  mainly  regards  training  in  EUs  as  being  acquired  through 
on‐the‐job  experience.  Accordingly,  it  does  not  provide  formal  training.  A 
significant  proportion  of  ASIC’s  workforce  has  undertaken  legal  studies  (at 
least  350  of  1816  total  staff,  with  a  higher  proportion  of  legally  qualified 
persons  in  the  enforcement  and  stakeholder  teams),  which  should  better 
position them to understand and apply the relevant rules and procedures. As 
previously  noted, ASIC  also  provides  guidance  that  is  clear,  comprehensive 
and straightforward to apply. 
2.41 Notwithstanding the skill profile of ASIC’s staff and the availability of 
suitable  guidance,  the  organisation  is  undergoing  significant  staff  turnover, 
with staffing  levels expected  to  fall by 209  (or 12 per cent)  in 2014–15.72 This 
level  of  staff  turnover  and  loss  of  corporate  knowledge  presents  risks  to 
administration, and  there would be merit  in ASIC considering whether some 
level of formal EU training should be provided. 
Monitoring and reporting on the performance of 
enforceable undertakings  
2.42 The Australian Government’s performance measurement and reporting 
framework  requires entities  to  set out  their outcome, programs, deliverables, 
key  performance  indicators  (KPIs)  and  expenses  in  their  Portfolio  Budget 
Statements and to report against these in the annual report. Specifically: 
 deliverables  provide  information  on  the  goods  and/or  services 
produced and/or delivered; and  
 KPIs  provide  information  on  how  effective  the  program  has  been  in 
achieving outcomes.  
ASIC’s  outcome, Program  1.1 Objective  and KPIs  for  2014–15  are  set  out  in 
Figure 2.3.73 
                                                     
72  ASIC, Annual Report 2013–2014, p. 4. 
73  ASIC Portfolio Budget Statement 2014–15, pp. 157–162. To achieve its outcome, ASIC has two 
programs. Program 1.2 covers the Banking Act 1959, the Life Insurance Act 1995, unclaimed monies 
and special accounts. 
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Figure 2.3: ASIC’s key performance indicators for 2014–15 
Source: ANAO, based on ASIC Portfolio Budget Statement 2014–15. 
2.43 ASIC  states  that  it  delivers  on  its  outcome  and  program  objective 
through engagement with  industry and  stakeholders,  surveillance, guidance, 
education, enforcement activities and policy advice. The impact and results of 
these  activities  are  measured  using  10  KPIs  across  ASIC’s  three  strategic 
priorities.  The  KPIs  applicable  to  EUs  are:  misconduct  is  dealt  with  and 
deterred;  fair  and  efficient  processes  are  in  place  for  resolution  of  disputes; 
product  issuers,  credit  providers  and  advisers  meet  required  standards; 
participants  in  financial  markets  meet  required  standards;  and  issuers  (of 
securities) and their officers meet required standards.  
2.44 These KPIs  are designed  to provide  information  that would  assist  in 
determining how ASIC undertakes its regulatory activities, including through 
EUs. However,  in  relation  to  the  first  two KPIs, ASIC has only  reported  in a 
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limited  way  in  its  2013–14  Annual  Report74,  and  did  not  report  against  the 
other  three KPIs  in  relation  to EUs.  In  addition,  all  five KPIs do not  specify 
performance  expectations,  or  include  targets,  benchmarks  or  timeframes  for 
achievements. Nor do  they  indicate  the  extent  to which ASIC’s  efforts  have 
contributed to achieving outcomes.75  
2.45 Given  that an enhanced Commonwealth performance  framework will 
come  into effect on 1  July 2015,  there  is an opportunity  for ASIC  to develop 
more appropriate performance measures and to report on the extent to which 
EUs support ASIC in achieving regulatory outcomes. A key first step for ASIC 
is  to  include  targets, benchmarks and/or  timeframes  in KPIs, and  to provide 
meaningful  information  to  key  stakeholders  on  the  effectiveness  of  EUs  in 
achieving desired regulatory outcomes. 
External reporting on EUs 
2.46 ASIC reports externally on its enforcement activities through two main 
publications:  its  annual  report  and  its  half‐yearly  enforcement  outcomes 
publications.  In  addition,  EUs  are  published  on  the  EU  register  on  ASIC’s 
website and through ASIC issuing of a media release with each EU.  
2.47 In  its  2013–14  Annual  Report,  ASIC  reported  that  it  had  achieved 
596 enforcement  ‘outcomes’,76  including  criminal  and  civil  litigation, 
administrative action and EUs.77 As  in previous years,  the annual report also 
referred  to  specific  examples  of  EUs.  ASIC’s  enforcement  outcomes 




74  In relation to the first KPI, reporting is limited to the number and detail of enforcement outcomes. In 
relation to the second KPI, ASIC’s Annual Report 2013–14 detailed the number of reports of 
misconduct dealt with, and the proportion finalised within 28 days but did not report against the 
fairness aspect of this KPI. All five KPIs were unchanged from ASIC’s 2013–14 Portfolio Budget 
Statements. 
75  According to a 2012 OECD Expert Paper, few countries have moved from identifying relevant activities 
and information to proper indicators for measuring the effectiveness of compliance activities: Radaelli 
C and Fritsch O, Measuring Regulatory Performance: Evaluating Regulatory Management Tools And 
Programmes, Expert Paper No. 2, July 2012, p. 18, available from 
<http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/2_Radaelli%20web.pdf> [accessed 9 December 2014]. 
76  While ASIC uses the term ‘outcome’, the reference is to the number of activities (a deliverable) rather 
than the broader effect of the activities on the behaviour of regulated entities. 
77  ASIC, Annual Report 2013–14, p. 158.  
78  The latest report being ASIC, Report 421: ASIC enforcement outcomes: July to December 2014. 
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2.48 Neither  the annual  report nor  the enforcement outcomes publications 




additional  commentary  on  EUs  commencing  in  its  2014–15  Annual  Report. 
This will address a Senate Economics References Committee recommendation 
that  ASIC  include  in  its  annual  report  additional  commentary  on:  ASIC’s 






the  effectiveness  of  EUs  in  addressing  non‐compliance.  ASIC  should  also 
periodically assess the extent to which EUs are contributing to improved levels 
of  voluntary  compliance.  Possible  sources  of  information  for  such  an 
assessment  include  complaints  data,  community  satisfaction  surveys  and 
surveys of regulated entities  (to  identify  the effect of EUs on  their awareness 
of, and willingness to comply with, relevant obligations). 
                                                     
79  Senate Economics References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Performance of the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission, 2014, p. 280. 
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Recommendation No.1  
2.50 To  assess  the  effectiveness  of  enforceable  undertakings  as  an 
appropriate  regulatory  tool  and  their  contribution  to  ASIC  achieving  its 
compliance objectives, the ANAO recommends that ASIC: 
(a) develops  appropriate  performance  measures  to  monitor  the 
effectiveness  of  enforceable  undertakings  in  addressing 
non‐compliance, and regularly reports against these measures; and 
(b) periodically  assesses,  and  reports  on,  the  effectiveness  of  enforceable 




undertakings given by promisors  in  enforceable undertakings.   Further,  in February 
2015  ASIC  revised  its  policy  about  aspects  of  its  administration  of  enforceable 
undertakings.    One  of  those  revisions  was  the  adoption  of  a  new  policy  that,  for 
undertakings  accepted  by ASIC  from  9 March  2015, ASIC will  publicly  report  on 
whether  promisors  have  complied  with  undertakings.  The  policy  applies  to  all 
undertakings  other  than  those  to  refrain  from  particular  conduct.  ASIC  has  also 
committed to enhanced enforceable undertaking reporting in its Annual Report. 
2.52 In  relation  to  Recommendation  1(b),  the  work  to  implement  enhanced 




2.53 Implementation  of  Recommendation  1(b)  will  allow  both  ASIC  and  its 
regulated  population  to  periodically  assess  the  effectiveness  of  enforceable 
undertakings,  and  enable ASIC  to  adapt  its  structured  compliance  and  enforcement 
approach as required.  
Measuring the costs of compliance options 
2.54 To  support  the  efficient  allocation  of  resources,  it  is  important  that 
ASIC  has  a  good  understanding  of  the  cost  of  its  compliance  activities,  in 
absolute  terms and  relative  to  regulatory alternatives. ASIC  should also  take 
into  account  the  regulatory  burden  it  imposes  on  entities,  noting  that  the 
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burden  of  compliance  (including  with  various  types  of  enforcement  action) 
should be proportionate to the seriousness of the breach.80 
2.55 Senior ASIC officers advised  the ANAO  that, while  they have a good 
understanding of  the costs of various  types of enforcement action  (including 
litigation  and  tribunal  hearings),  ASIC  does  not  capture  the  costs  of  EUs.81 
However,  there  have  recently  been  some  initiatives  to  determine  aspects  of 
these costs.82 There would be benefit in ASIC commencing work to establish a 




2.56 ASIC’s  decisions  and  actions  regarding  EUs  are  underpinned  by  a 
structured  compliance  and  enforcement  approach.  EUs  are  an  important 
sanction that have a clearly defined role within ASIC’s risk‐based compliance 
and  enforcement  framework. ASIC  has  an  understanding  of  the  advantages 
and  disadvantages  of  EUs  when  compared  to  other  available  alternative 
sanctions, although there is scope for ASIC to develop a better understanding 
of the costs of EUs. 
2.57 ASIC  has  appropriate  organisational  arrangements  underpinning  the 
use of EUs. These arrangements are based on day‐to‐day administration by a 
stakeholder  team  or  enforcement  team  across  the  various  financial  market 
segments. There is high‐level direction and other input by SELs and the CLO, 
and  involvement  of  the  Enforcement  Committee  and  Commission  for  more 




80  Productivity Commission, Regulator Audit Framework, p. 27. During hearings, the Chair of the Senate 
Economics References Committee expressed concern that ASIC was overly focused on the potential 
cost to a promisor (Commonwealth Financial Planning) of complying with an EU. Senate Economics 
References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Performance of the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission, 2014, pp. 166–167. 
81  ASIC does, however, capture the costs of investigations and enforcement projects more generally. 
One of the major uses of time recording for ASIC is to allow it to allocate costs to matters and, where a 
threshold is reached, to recover those costs from its enforcement special account. 
82  In September 2014, ASIC advised its stakeholder teams that they were now required to record the 
time they spend assisting enforcement teams with EUs, including contributing to the monitoring of EUs 
for which enforcement teams are responsible. 
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2.58 ASIC’s  internal  and  external  guidance  is  clear,  comprehensive  and 
straightforward  to  apply.  However,  ASIC’s  workflow  and  document 
management  systems  are  complex  and  procedures  are  not  always  followed. 
Consequently,  there  is  scope  for ASIC  to  consolidate  information  relating  to 
EUs, and to reinforce to staff the need to store all documentation relating to an 
EU in accordance with ASIC policies and procedures.  
2.59 ASIC  reports  externally  the number  of EUs  entered  into  (through  its 
annual report and enforcement outcomes publications), and publishes the full 
text of  each EU on  its website.  It  is  also preparing  to publicly  report on  the 
outcomes of EUs  in  its annual reports,  in accordance with a recommendation 
by  the  Senate  Economics References Committee. ASIC  should  also  develop, 
and  report  against,  appropriate  performance  measures  that  assess  the 
effectiveness  of EUs  as  a  regulatory  tool  and  the  contribution  they make  to 
achieving compliance objectives. 
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3. Entering into Enforceable 
Undertakings 












To  enable  this  assessment,  the ANAO  analysed  the  53 EUs ASIC  entered  into 
between 1 January 2012 and 30 June 2014.83  
3.3 The ANAO also requested ASIC to advise the number of EUs offered or 
negotiated, but not entered  into, over  this period. While ASIC provided  some 
relevant  examples,  it  does  not  routinely  collect  data  regarding  such  cases, 
including the reason why the EU was not accepted. Collecting such information 
could assist ASIC to review and improve its EU processes. 
Accepting and negotiating enforceable undertakings 
3.4 EUs can be proposed either by a regulated entity or ASIC.  In 19 of  the 
53 cases reviewed, it was ASIC, rather than the promisor, that suggested an EU 
as  a means  of  addressing  the  entity’s misconduct. Regardless  of which  party 
initiates  the  EU,  senior  management  is  involved  in  the  process  to  determine 
whether the EU will produce an effective regulatory outcome. 
                                                     
83  For each of these EUs, the ANAO examined: negotiation documentation—communication between 
ASIC and the promisor, including emails, letters and file notes of correspondence; and  
decision-making records—including internal memos and emails, file notes and relevant approvals. 
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Senior management involvement 
3.5 ASIC’s Enforcement Manual requires  that written approval be obtained 
from the relevant Senior Executive Leader (SEL) before an ASIC officer enters 
into  discussions  with  a  regulated  entity  about  accepting  an  EU.  Prior  to 
obtaining approval, a memo should be prepared outlining the circumstances of 
the matter and why acceptance of  the EU will change  the entity’s behaviour, 
protect  investors  and/or  creditors,  or  compensate  wronged  parties.  Since 
August  2014,  where  the  matter  is  a  ‘high  profile  or  controversial  or  major 




at an early  stage  in negotiations,  in accordance with  the Enforcement Manual. 
This review identified early‐stage SEL approval for 41 of the 53 EUs reviewed 
(77 per cent).84 For the remaining cases,  it was often evident that the SEL had 
some  involvement  in  the  matter—sometimes  even  leading  the  negotiations 
with the regulated entity—even though there was no written approval on the 
case  file.  Table  3.1  outlines  the  level  of  SEL  involvement  in  the  53 EUs 
reviewed by the ANAO. 
                                                     
84  A memo setting out the background of the matter and recommending an EU was identified for 38 of 
the 53 EUs (72 per cent), although the format and content of these memos varied considerably and 
did not always address the matters required. The cases where there was a memo did not always 
coincide with those with an early approval—there were five EUs where there was a memo, but no 
early approval, and eight cases where there was an early approval but no memo. This is because of 
poor record keeping, sometimes because approvals/memos took the form of oral briefings.  
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Table 3.1: Level of involvement of Senior Executive Leaders in 
decisions to negotiate and accept enforceable undertakings 




Extensive The SEL had very active involvement in negotiating the 
EU, including direct negotiation with the promisor. 
 5  9 
High The SEL had a high level of involvement in negotiating 
the EU, including providing suggestions about its terms. 
 21  40 
Medium The SEL was involved at key decision points but had 
little further involvement in the negotiation process. 
 19  36 
Limited There was evidence of some involvement by the SEL in 
negotiating the EU, but that involvement was relatively 
insignificant. 
 7  13 
None There was no documentation demonstrating any SEL 
involvement in negotiating the EU. 
 1  2 
Total   53  100 
Source: ANAO analysis of ASIC decision-making documentation relating to EUs accepted between 
1 January 2012 and 30 June 2014.  
3.7 Of the eight EUs with limited or no evidence of SEL involvement, poor 
record keeping  could be  a  contributing  factor.  In discussions with  five  SELs 
involved in these EUs, all exhibited considerable knowledge about the EUs for 
which  they were  responsible.  Further,  there were  email  records  of meetings 
being arranged between ASIC staff and SELs relating to the decision to accept 
an offer of an EU, indicating that there may have been oral briefings.85 
3.8 While  it  may  be  appropriate  to  discuss  the  possibility  of  an  EU 
informally prior  to ASIC  entering  into  formal discussions,  there  are  risks  in 
ASIC staff discussing potential terms of EUs without clear written instructions 
from senior management. For example, in one EU negotiation, an ASIC officer 
mistakenly  advised  a  promisor  that  ASIC  would  agree  to  a  period  of 
suspension not  requiring  the  cancellation  of  the  auditor’s  registration. Upon 
being informed about this, the relevant SEL required the ASIC officer to retract 
the  statement  as  the  SEL’s  position  was  that  ASIC  should  insist  upon 
cancellation of the auditor’s registration.  
3.9 Overall, while approvals and  relevant documentation  could be  found 
for the majority of cases, the format and content of this documentation varied 
substantially  between  cases.  Even  though  the  Enforcement Manual  provides 
                                                     
85  Minutes were not prepared to record the discussions or outcomes of these meetings. 
Entering into Enforceable Undertakings 
 
ANAO Report No.38 2014–15 






a  short  email  or  a  comprehensive  formal  memo)  and  the  varying  ways  in 
which SELs gave  their approval  to an EU  (usually by email, but occasionally 
by  signing  a memo).  There would  be merit  in ASIC  reinforcing  to  staff  the 
importance  of  complying  with  the  Enforcement  Manual  in  relation  to  the 
processes  for  obtaining  approvals  for  an  EU,  in  order  to  improve 
accountability  and  better  position  SELs  to make decisions  about whether  to 
accept an EU.  
Decisions to accept an EU 
3.10 In  the  absence  of  statutory  guidance  about when  it  is  appropriate  to 
accept an EU, ASIC has developed Regulatory Guide 100 to guide its use of EUs. 
The guide states that ASIC will only accept an EU as an alternative to seeking a 
civil order  from a court,  taking administrative action or  referring a matter  to 
another  administrative  body.  It  will  not  accept  an  EU  as  an  alternative  to 
criminal  action,  after  the matter has  been  referred  to  a  specialist  body  or  in 








(removing  the promisor  from  the  industry), or  to remove profits pending  the 




3.12 In  assessing whether  an  EU would  constitute  an  effective  regulatory 
response,  ASIC  has  regard  to  four  critical  considerations:  the  position  of 
consumers and investors; the effect on the promisor’s future conduct; the effect 
                                                     
86  ASIC, Regulatory Guide 100: Enforceable undertakings, February 2015, p. 9. 
 
ANAO Report No.38 2014–15 








Table 3.2: ASIC’s rationale for accepting an enforceable undertaking 




The position of consumers and investors was explicitly considered for 
36 of the 53 EUs reviewed. Reasons cited for accepting an EU included 
that it would: 
 facilitate the protection of investors and consumers (especially where 
the EU provides for a promisor to be removed from the industry 
through a banning or suspension);  
 result in affected consumers being financially better off (where the 
EU provides for rectification); 
 better inform consumers (such as where the EU provides for 
corrective advertising or notices); and 
 improve the quality of advice or service being provided to consumers 
of the regulated entity (especially where the EU provides for a 




For 19 EUs reviewed, explicit consideration was given to the effect of the 
EU on the promisor’s future conduct. This mainly took the form of views 
expressed that the EU would: 
 have a deterrence impact on the individual or company; 
 improve the entity’s compliance programs and systems and in that 
way reduce the likelihood of future breaches (where the EU provided 
for a compliance program review); and 
 immediately remove the promisor from the industry. 
Effect on the 
regulated 
population as a 
whole 
In the case of 14 EUs, explicit consideration was given to the EU’s effect 
on the broader regulated population. Examples of such consideration 
included statements that the EU would: 
 send a wider message to the profession; 
 be educative and achieve general deterrence in making the business 
community aware of the conduct and the consequences arising from 
engaging in the conduct; and 
 offer a publicly reportable outcome (more than infringement notices 
or other negotiated outcomes). 
                                                     
87  ASIC, Regulatory Guide 100: Enforceable undertakings, February 2015, p. 10. 
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Factor ANAO’s assessment 
Quick and cost 
effective 
outcome 
For 27 EUs, explicit consideration was given to the benefit of swift and 
cost effective resolution of the matter. This was usually found in 
comments that the EU would: 
 provide a quicker and/or more cost effective outcome than 
other regulatory tools; 
 avoid the time and cost of completing an investigation; 
 avoid the risk of an adverse costs order against ASIC in the 
event that it was unsuccessful in the proceedings (where civil 
penalty proceedings were a prospect); and 
 provide a certain outcome and deliver a quicker outcome for 
consumers/investors. 
Source: ANAO analysis of ASIC decision-making documentation relating to EUs accepted between 
1 January 2012 and 30 June 2014.  
3.13 The decision‐making documentation for most EUs examined (44 of 53), 
revealed  justification  for  the  EU  by  reference  to  at  least  one  of  the  factors 
outlined above. The most  commonly  considered critical  consideration was  the 
position  of  consumers  and  investors  (36  of  53  EUs),  with  the  effect  on  the 
promisor’s  future  conduct  explicitly  considered  in  fewer  cases  (19  of  53).88  In 
slightly over half the cases reviewed, ASIC explicitly considered EUs as a quick 
and cost effective outcome. While this could be a convenient approach for ASIC, 
in  25  of  the  27  cases  there  was  also  clear  consideration  of  the  comparative 
regulatory outcomes likely to arise from other enforcement actions, as discussed 
further in the following section.  
3.14 It  is  also  noted  that  the  impact  of  the  EU  on  the  broader  regulated 
population  (the  general  deterrence  effect)  was  explicitly  considered  in  only 
14 EUs. In an environment of constrained regulatory resources, it is important 
that  regulatory  decisions  consider  the  impact  on  the  broader  regulated 
population, not just the individual regulated entity that is the subject of ASIC’s 
concerns. An  example  of  general deterrence  being  considered  as part  of  the 
decision‐making  process  for  an  EU  is  shown  in  the  following  case  study 
relating to the 2012 EU accepted from the Commonwealth Bank of Australia. 
                                                     
88  However, there were many EUs where the regulated promisor’s future conduct was implicitly (rather 
than explicitly) considered. This was often obvious from the terms of the EU (such as where an EU 
suspended a promisor from an industry, as this would limit the ability for the promisor to engage in 
misconduct for that period). 
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Case study – Commonwealth Bank of Australia credit limit increase invitations  
In July 2011, the Australian Parliament passed into law an amendment to the National 
Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 restricting credit providers from offering to consumers a 
credit limit increase in respect of their credit card unless prior informed consent to receiving 
such invitations had been provided by the consumer. The commencement date for these 
provisions was 1 July 2012 and a transitional provision was included, allowing credit providers 
to obtain consents prior to 1 July 2012. 
In response to these legislative changes, ASIC expected that credit card issuers would 
contact consumers offering them a mechanism to opt-in to continue to receive credit limit 
increase offers. ASIC was concerned that, during this period, consumers had to be 
appropriately informed about the nature of the choice being offered to them, to ensure that the 
legislative changes would have the desired effect of reducing household over-indebtedness. 
Between 12 and 14 December 2011, the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) sent 
electronic messages to its consumers to obtain their consent to receive credit limit increase 
invitations in the future. ASIC became aware of this through a staff member receiving one of 
these messages, and contacted CBA informing them that it considered the messages to be 
misleading. While disagreeing with ASIC’s characterisation of the messages, CBA promptly 
withdrew the messages, consulted with ASIC about the content of a more appropriate 
message and informed ASIC of its willingness to resolve the matter.  
At a meeting between ASIC senior executives and a Commissioner on 16 December 2011, it 
was decided that ASIC would discuss the matter with CBA and seek to have CBA take steps 
to communicate with cardholders and to inform them more accurately of their options. Though 
CBA was willing to undertake these actions on an informal and voluntary basis, ASIC required 
the bank to formalise the arrangement by way of an EU. The reason for this was to help ASIC 
communicate the issue, and its views of CBA’s conduct, to the industry and to the public.  
As an alternative, ASIC considered commencing civil proceedings for a declaration that the 
message was misleading and for remedial action to be taken; however, a decision was 
considered very unlikely to be achieved by 1 July 2012, by which time the remainder of the 
industry would probably have sent their messages to consumers about the opt-in choice. 
Accordingly, ASIC considered that court action was less likely to support it in communicating 
the issue to the industry and the public. The length of time required for civil action was 
demonstrated in a recent case where ASIC took civil penalty action against GE Capital 
Finance for serious misleading and deceptive conduct in relation to credit limit increase 
invitations. Although a penalty of $1.5 million was imposed in this case, this outcome was not 
reached until 1 July 2014 (two years after the misconduct). 
Following negotiations with CBA, an EU was ultimately accepted by ASIC on 6 March 2012 in 
which CBA acknowledged that ASIC’s views were reasonably held, and agreed to not rely on 
the previously-obtained consents and to contact consumers who consented correcting any 
misleading impression and informing them of their rights. CBA provided confirmation of 
compliance with these undertakings on 23 March 2012. 
Source: ANAO analysis of ASIC documentation. 
Considering regulatory outcomes 
3.15 As  well  as  having  regard  to  the  four  critical  considerations,  the 
Enforcement Manual  requires  that,  in  deciding whether  to  accept  an  EU,  the 
regulatory  outcome  that  could  be  achieved  by  accepting  an  EU  should  be 
compared with the outcomes that might be achieved by taking other available 
action  such as  civil or administrative action. The ANAO  identified  that  such 
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had  come  to  the  view  that  an  EU  would  provide  an  equivalent  or  greater 
outcome  than  through  contested  proceedings—particularly  in  terms  of  the 
length  of  suspension  or  banning  that  could  be  achieved  through  an  EU 
compared to administrative or civil action. In many areas, ASIC had drawn on 
its  corporate  knowledge  of  the  quantum  of  sanction  that  would  likely  be 
imposed  by  a  particular  court,  tribunal  or  disciplinary  body.  Where  ASIC 
identified  that  the court,  tribunal or disciplinary body was  likely  to  impose a 
sanction similar to or less than could be agreed with the promisor by way of an 
EU, ASIC preferred to use an EU to resolve the matter. 
3.17 In  16  instances,  ASIC  considered  that  the  other  regulatory  tools 
available  would  not  sufficiently  enhance  the  position  of  consumers  or 
investors, or would not have  the desired deterrence  impact on  the  regulated 
population  as  a whole. An  example  of  this was where  the main  regulatory 
alternative was issuing an infringement notice. In this circumstance, ASIC staff 
concluded  that  penalty  amounts  available  through  an  infringement  notice 
were insufficient to send a strong enough deterrence message to the regulated 
entity and the broader regulated population, and would not otherwise operate 
to  improve  the  regulated  entity’s  compliance  with  the  law.  For  five  of  the 
53 EUs, ASIC combined the EU with the  issuing of an  infringement notice. In 
these cases, the EU operated in a protective manner to improve compliance of 









89  Of these EUs, 42 also had evidence of reference to at least one of the critical considerations outlined 
above. Two of the 44 cases that had made reference to at least one of the critical considerations did 
not also have documented consideration of the alternative regulatory outcomes. Consequently, there 
was documentary evidence for 46 EUs that ASIC had either considered at least one of the critical 
considerations or alternative regulatory outcomes. 
 
ANAO Report No.38 2014–15 
Administration of Enforceable Undertakings 
 
68 







effective  regulatory  outcome.  In  the  case  of  the  other  seven  EUs,  there  was 




the  seven  cases  was  defensible.  However,  the  need  for  these  statements 
highlights significant deficiencies in ASIC’s record keeping arrangements. 
Negotiating enforceable undertakings 
3.20 The  process  for  negotiating  an  EU  varies  greatly,  depending  on  the 
individual circumstances of each matter. In some cases, the offer to enter into an 
EU comes at a very early stage, with the entity proposing an EU in response to 







negotiations  will  not  usually  be  appropriate.90  Where  an  EU  is  subject  to 
prolonged  negotiations,  this may  detract  from  one  of  the  key  benefits  of  an 
EU—achieving community benefits as quickly and cost effectively as possible. 
To  assess whether  EU  negotiations were  concluded  in  a  timely manner,  the 




90  The Enforcement Manual does not provide standard timeframes or guidance in relation to an 
acceptable timeframe for EU negotiations. The time taken to negotiate an EU will necessarily depend 
on the nature and complexity of each matter. 
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Figure 3.1: Time taken from proposing to formally accepting an 
enforceable undertaking 
 
Source: ANAO analysis of ASIC decision-making documentation relating to EUs accepted between 
1 January 2012 and 30 June 2014. 
Note: A month in this figure refers to a whole month. Accordingly, if an EU was concluded within one and 
a half months, it would appear in this figure in the 0 – 1 month grouping. 
3.22 For  32  of  the  53  EUs  assessed,  the  time  from  an  EU  being  initially 
proposed to acceptance was less than six months. This compares favourably to 
the  likely  length  of  time  to  resolve  matters  using  other  regulatory  tools 
available to ASIC (such as court action or an application to a specialist body).  
3.23 In  five  of  the  six  instances  where  the  time  between  an  EU  being 
proposed to acceptance was twelve months or more, the promisor had ceased 




Similar factors existed for  the 15 EUs where  the  time  taken  to finalise  the EU 
was between  six and 11 months.  In no  case  reviewed did  the  length of  time 
taken  to  negotiate  the  EU  appear  to  have  significantly  detracted  from  the 
effectiveness of the EU as a regulatory outcome. 
3.24 Overall, ASIC negotiates reasonably and in good faith—offers made by 
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a  proposal  of  the  promisor,  the  basis  for  this  rejection  is  explained  to  the 
promisor  and  the  promisor  given  a  chance  to  respond.  ASIC  did  not 
differentiate based on the size of the entity. There were no instances identified 
where promisors were  treated differently based on  the size of  their business, 
beyond those differences explained by the differing factual circumstances.  
3.25 Decision‐making  in respect of  the EUs entered  into with  large entities 
was somewhat more extensive than for the other EUs in the ANAO’s sample. 
None of the eight EUs for which the level of SEL involvement was assessed as 
‘limited’ or  ‘none’  involved a  large entity, and only one of  the seven EUs  for 
which  there  was  insufficient  documentation  to  support  whether  the  EU 
presented an effective  regulatory outcome  related  to a  large entity.91 Further, 
the  decision‐making  documentation  supporting  the  EUs  with  large  entities 
revealed greater consideration of  the  impact on consumers and  investors,  the 
effect on the promisor’s future conduct and the general deterrence effect than 
for EUs in the ANAO’s sample as a whole.  
Terms of enforceable undertakings 
3.26 An  important aspect of  the negotiation of an EU  is  for ASIC and  the 
promisor  to agree  to acceptable  terms upon which  the EU can be settled. As 
EUs  are  tailored  to  a  specific  matter,  their  terms  will  depend  on  the 
circumstances  of  the  case  and,  in  particular,  the  misconduct  that  is  being 
addressed.  
Clear statement about the alleged misconduct 
3.27 In its report into ASIC’s performance, the Senate Economics References 
Committee recommended that ASIC ‘require a clearer acknowledgement in the 
undertaking of what  the misconduct was’.92 This  recommendation  addresses 
comments by  stakeholders  that EUs did not  always:  contain  sufficient detail 
about  the  alleged misconduct  for  the public  to understand why  the EU was 
being accepted; and include a sufficiently clear admission of fault.93  
                                                     
91  In this case, the relevant SEL led the negotiations with the regulated entity and provided a statement 
to the ANAO outlining why an EU presented the most effective regulatory outcome. 
92  Senate Economics References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Performance of the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission, 2014, p. 280. 
93  Senate Economics References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Performance of the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission, 2014, p. 271. 
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3.28 ASIC’s Regulatory Guide 100 requires  that EUs set out  the detail of  the 
relevant  misconduct  and  ASIC’s  assessment  of  that  conduct.  To  assess 
compliance with this policy, the ANAO sought to identify the extent to which 
the  undertakings  were  sufficiently  clear  about  the  alleged  misconduct.  The 
ANAO identified that 45 of the 53 EUs reviewed were sufficiently clear about 
the  misconduct,  although  it  was  noted  that  the  EUs  were  generally  not 
comprehensive.  For  example,  the  EUs  did  not  always  include  relevant 




3.29 There  would  be  merit  in  ASIC  taking  steps  to  ensure  that  EUs  are 
clearer about the alleged misconduct, so that they better serve their educative, 
guidance  and  deterrence  functions.  It  would  also  allow  other  industry 
participants  to more fully understand ASIC’s views on certain conduct. ASIC 
advises that in practice many promisors strongly resist clear statements about 
misconduct  and  requiring  more  detail  in  EUs  may  lead  to  a  reduced 
willingness by promisors to offer EUs. While appreciating this is likely to be a 




Acknowledging ASIC’s position 
3.30 Since February 2012, Regulatory Guide 100 has stated that ASIC will not 





ASIC’s views are  reasonably held. The analysis  identified  that 19 EUs  either 
did not have a clause in which the promisor acknowledged ASIC’s views were 
reasonably  held  and/or  had  a  clause  in  which  ASIC  acknowledged  that 
nothing in the EU constituted an admission by the promisor. 
                                                     
94  ASIC, Regulatory Guide 100: Enforceable Undertakings, February 2012, p. 15. 
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3.32 While  agreeing  to  the  inclusion  of  a  non‐admission  clause  or  to  the 
non‐inclusion  of  a  clause  acknowledging  the  reasonableness  of  ASIC’s 
concerns may be appropriate  in an  individual case, consideration needs to be 
given  to  the possibility of  that decision being  seen as a precedent  that other 
regulated entities negotiating an EU may seek to rely upon. Although previous 
EUs  are  not  binding  on  future  decisions  of  ASIC,  they  may  make  it  more 
difficult  to  argue  a  principled  position  in  later  negotiations  and  may  place 
ASIC in a more constrained bargaining position. On this basis, ASIC may wish 
to consider adopting a more consistent approach  to  the use of  these  terms  in 
future EUs. 
Substantive terms of enforceable undertakings 
3.33 The  terms of an EU are  subject  to negotiation between ASIC and  the 
promisor, although ASIC is only to accept an EU where the terms offered will 
deliver an effective regulatory outcome. ASIC’s Regulatory Guide 100 gives an 
indication  of  the  terms  that  ASIC  may  accept  in  an  EU,  including  terms 
regarding:  compliance  and monitoring;  rectification  or  compensatory  action; 





A  proportionate  response will minimise  the  level  of  regulatory  intervention 
required  to effectively mitigate  the  risks as well as  the  costs  to  the  regulator 
and to the promisor. 
3.35 To assess whether the terms in the EUs reviewed were a proportionate 
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Table 3.3: Basis for including terms in enforceable undertakings 
Term Basis for ASIC accepting term 
Independent 
review 
Where independent reviews were required as part of an EU with a company, 
it was viewed by ASIC that the appointment of the independent expert would 
enable the business to move towards being compliant with the law and allow 
ASIC to monitor this. 
Independent reviews were more likely to be included in an EU where ASIC’s 
concerns related to a lack of adequate oversight, policies, processes or 
systems and where the promisor was cooperative. These are circumstances 
where the appointment of an independent expert to conduct independent 
reviews might be more likely to achieve the desired regulatory outcomes, 
such as changes to the promisor’s business practices. 
Where the independent review requirement was accepted as part of an EU 
with an individual, this was usually in addition to the acceptance of a term 
requiring the individual to cease providing advice/services for a period (a 
suspension period). The basis for including these terms was less well 
explained in the decision-making documentation, but was intended to improve 




In all cases where there was a term in an EU requiring the promisor to 
undertake continuing professional education, this was in addition to other 
substantive terms (most commonly a suspension and/or independent expert 
review). This indicated that these educational requirements were intended to 
operate in conjunction with, and in support of, other obligations. Reasons for 
including a term requiring continuing professional education included: 
 to ensure that the promisor does not contravene the law again;  
 to rehabilitate the promisor; and 
 because the completion of a training program may indicate a willingness 
to comply with relevant legislative requirements.  
Rectification Where a term in an EU required some form of rectification, the required 
rectification generally operated to undo the relevant misconduct. The 
decision-making documents showed two principles underpinning the inclusion 
of rectification terms: a promisor should not gain from misconduct; and 
consumers or investors should not be disadvantaged by the misconduct. 
In two cases, the rectification terms in the EUs resulted in windfall gains for 
some consumers. These windfall gains, however, were not intended by ASIC, 
but rather necessary to ensure the rectification processes were 
administratively workable. 
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The inclusion of a term requiring a promisor to cease providing advice or 
services (such as financial services or acting as a liquidator) for a period, in 
most cases was underpinned by an interest in protecting the public from the 
promisor.  
Where the EU contained a term requiring the promisor to cease providing 
financial services or credit activities, in determining the length of suspension 
to be accepted, ASIC staff usually made reference to the outcome likely to be 
achieved through administrative action. In making these assessments, 
consideration was given to the factors and likely outcome in Regulatory 
Guide 98 (for financial services)95 and/or Regulatory Guide 218 (for credit).96 
For EUs that included a term requiring the promisor to cease performing acts 
that only a registered auditor or registered liquidator can perform, 
consideration was normally given to the outcome that could be expected if an 
application were made to the Companies and Liquidators Disciplinary Board. 
These assessments depended on a comparison with previously decided 
applications involving similar factual circumstances. 
Professional 
registration 
Where the misconduct was particularly egregious or where the protection of 
the public was required, ASIC only accepted the EU on condition that the 




ASIC’s Regulatory Guide 100 includes guidance on when it is appropriate to 
include a requirement to make a community benefit payment in an EU. The 
guide states that a payment should be proportional to the alleged conduct, 
having regard to the: 
 penalties that could be applied in relation to the alleged conduct; and 
 amount of profit made, or loss avoided, as a result of the conduct the 
subject of the EU. 
For all EUs where a community benefit payment was accepted as part of an 
EU, one or both of these factors was considered as part of the decision to 
accept an amount (despite all of the EUs reviewed pre-dating this policy). 
Source: ANAO analysis of ASIC decision-making documentation relating to EUs accepted between  
1 January 2012 and 30 June 2014. 
3.36 Table 3.3  indicates that  in negotiating and accepting the terms of EUs, 
ASIC staff demonstrated an understanding of the regulatory aims sought to be 
achieved  through  the  inclusion of a particular  term, and  that  terms  included 
within  EUs  were  generally  a  proportionate  regulatory  response  to  the 
non‐compliance. This is demonstrated, for example, by the fact that the periods 
of suspension for liquidators and auditors, and promisors engaged in credit or 
financial  services,  had  regard  to  relevant  regulatory  guides  and/or  previous 
decisions of a disciplinary body or administrative decision‐maker.  
                                                     
95  ASIC, Regulatory Guide 98: Licensing: Administrative action against financial services providers. 
96  ASIC, Regulatory Guide 218: Licensing: Administrative action against persons engaging in credit 
activities. 
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of  the  promisor.  A  systematic  evaluation  of  the  compliance  effectiveness  of 
EUs  is  likely  to  allow  ASIC  to  develop  a  greater  understanding  of  the 
effectiveness  of  EU  terms.  This would  allow ASIC  to  better  understand  the 
basis  for  including  particular  terms  and  in  turn,  provide  a  firmer  basis  for 
requiring the inclusion of particular terms in EUs. 
3.38 The  use  of  ‘good  faith’  terms97  in  four  of  the  EUs  reviewed  is  one 
exception  to  the  terms  in  EUs  being  proportionate  to  the  level  of 
non‐compliance. Discussions with ASIC staff  indicated  that  they believed  the 
inclusion of  these  terms was occasionally necessary  to prevent  the promisors 
from undermining the EU. There would be benefit  in ASIC evaluating  its use 
of good faith terms to ensure that their  inclusion does not unreasonably  limit 
the  legitimate  free expression by promisors  (including  legitimate  criticism of 
ASIC)  or  result  in  a perceived difference  in  treatment  by ASIC  of  regulated 
entities. 
Terms that specify monitoring arrangements 
3.39 An  important  consideration  in  negotiating  the  terms  of  EUs  are  the 
arrangements  for:  ensuring  that  the  alleged  misconduct  does  not  recur; 
monitoring compliance with  the undertakings; and reporting  to ASIC.  In  this 
regard,  Regulatory  Guide  100  requires  that  ASIC  must  be  satisfied  that  ‘the 
promisor has adequate arrangements  for monitoring how  the undertaking  is 
implemented and reporting to ASIC’.98 
3.40 The  Enforcement Manual  is  generally  silent  on  whether  a  monitoring 
term should be included in an EU. The main guidance provided by the Manual 




97  These terms required the promisor to refrain from undertaking any acts inconsistent with the terms and 
objectives of the undertaking, including ‘publishing or making any statement which is derogatory of, 
denigrates or trivialises the terms, objectives or any other aspect of’ the undertaking. 
98  ASIC, Regulatory Guide 100: Enforceable Undertakings, p. 14. The guide specifies terms that may be 
included in an EU for these purposes, including monitoring and reporting mechanisms the promisor 
will adopt, and any external assessment of the changes that are put in place. 
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Table 3.4: Monitoring terms included in the ANAO’s review of 
enforceable undertakings 
Term ANAO assessment the of use of the term 
Independent 
Reviews 
Thirty EUs included a term requiring an independent expert to undertake 
an independent review of specified matters. These reviewers were 
required to produce reports containing the findings of their review and 
provide these reports to ASIC. Independent experts and reviews are 





Thirteen EUs included a term requiring an individual to undertake 
specified continuing professional education. In seven of these EUs, 
there was also a term requiring the promisor to provide proof of the 
completion of the education—usually documentary confirmation 






For 12 EUs, there was a term requiring the promisor to provide 
confirmation to ASIC upon the completion of undertaking(s) contained in 
the EU. This confirmation took a number of forms, including written 
statements, statutory declarations and reports. In some cases, 




In 10 EUs involving individuals, the EU required the individual offering 
the EU to report to ASIC about their employment. The specific 
requirements of the reporting depended on the EU. In some cases, the 
individual only had to inform ASIC of their new employer. In other cases, 
the individual had to provide regular reports to ASIC about their activities 
over a specified period.  
Reporting 
non-compliance 
In six EUs, a term required the promisor to notify ASIC of any failures to 
comply with obligations contained in the EU. These terms were in 
addition to reporting obligations already imposed on Australian financial 
services licensees under the Corporations Act 2001.  
Other Other monitoring terms included the requirement for the promisor to 
meet with ASIC on a periodic basis (two EUs) and for one EU, a term 
requiring the promisor to notify ASIC of any change in the status of its 
authorised representatives. 
Source: ANAO review of EUs accepted by ASIC between 1 January 2012 and 30 June 2014. 
3.42 Overall,  38  of  the  53  EUs  reviewed  had  one  or  more  terms  that 
facilitated the monitoring of compliance with the EU. Where the EU contained 
a  monitoring  term,  these  terms  were  generally  well  designed  and  likely  to 
provide  ASIC  with  a  sound  basis  for  determining  whether  there  was 
compliance with the EU.  
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3.43 Of  the 15 EUs  that did not contain a monitoring arrangement, 12 had 
primarily  negative  obligations—that  is,  undertakings  to  refrain  from  doing 
specified  acts,  such  as  engaging  in  credit  activities  or  providing  financial 
services.  In  the  remaining  three  cases,  the  EU  imposed  mainly  positive 
obligations  upon  the  promisor  (for  example,  issuing  corrective  notices  to 
consumers). There was no requirement for the promisors to report to ASIC on 
their performance of those positive obligations.  
3.44 It  is  noted  however,  that  of  the  38  EUs  with  one  or  more  terms 
facilitating  the monitoring of  compliance with  the EU,  these  terms were not 
always exhaustive as they did not cover all positive obligations under the EU. 
This  is  particularly  evident  with  EUs  requiring  the  promisor  to  undertake 
continuing professional education, where just over half of the EUs (seven of 13) 
required  the  promisor  to  provide  proof  to  ASIC  of  their  completion  of  the 
educational  requirements.99  This  inconsistency  also  relates  to  differences  in 
practices  between  teams  involved  in  negotiating  EUs—with  all  six  EUs 
involving  a  financial  services matter  that  included  a  continuing professional 
education  requirement also  requiring proof of  the  education  to be provided, 
while only one in five such EUs involving an auditor matter contained a term 
requiring proof to be provided. 
3.45 In  its  report,  the  Senate  Economics  References  Committee 
recommended  that ASIC  ‘as  its default position,  require  that an  independent 
expert  be  appointed  to  supervise  the  implementation  of  the  terms  of  the 
undertaking’.100 While  the appointment of an  independent  expert  is  likely  to 
improve the ability of ASIC to monitor compliance with an EU, in many cases 
these benefits may not outweigh  the  financial cost of an  independent expert. 
This  is especially the case where the EU  involves one‐off rather than ongoing 
obligations. Further, a large number of EUs contain undertakings that are not 
suitable  for  review  by  an  independent  expert.  For  example,  those where  an 
individual agrees to remove themselves from the industry for a period of time. 
On  this  basis,  ASIC’s  policy  that  the  requirement  for  an  independent 
compliance expert be assessed on a case‐by‐case basis remains appropriate. 
                                                     
99  These EUs are not captured as part of the three EUs referred to above. This is because these seven 
EUs contained other positive obligations that were subject to a reporting requirement (for example, 
providing an independent expert report). 
100  Senate Economics References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Performance of the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission, 2014, p. 271. 
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monitor  compliance  with  EUs.  In  particular,  there  would  be  merit  in  ASIC 
adopting a policy requiring that where an EU contains positive obligations on 
a promisor, an obligation be included in the EU for the promisor to report back 
to ASIC and provide proof of  its performance of  that obligation.101  Including 
reporting obligations  in  respect of  all positive obligations  in EUs  is  likely  to 
improve ASIC’s  ability  to monitor  and  report  on  compliance with EUs,  and 
report on the effectiveness of these in achieving desired regulatory outcomes. 
Importantly, this information could be used by ASIC to inform its monitoring 
of a promisor’s  compliance with an EU and, where necessary,  to  respond  to 
non‐compliance.  The  Enforcement  Manual  would  need  to  be  amended  to 
provide guidance on the form that such reporting obligations should take.  






3.48 The  ANAO  reviewed  each  of  the  EUs  accepted  during  the  review 
period to determine whether standard terms were included in EUs. The media 
and  publicity  and  non‐derogation  terms  were  present  in  all  53  of  the  EUs 
reviewed. A term providing ASIC with access to relevant documents to assess 
compliance with the EU was identified for 50 of the 53 EUs. 
Finalising enforceable undertakings  
3.49 Once ASIC and the promisor come to an agreement on the terms of an 
EU and an offer  is formally made to ASIC, the Enforcement Manual requires a 





101  Even where such a clause is not included, ASIC may still be able to monitor and establish compliance 
with the EUs by requesting documents under the standard clause in EUs. However, this is likely to be 
less straightforward than a clear positive reporting obligation on the promisor. 
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Approval from the Chief Legal Office 
3.50 Prior to seeking final senior management approval for an EU, approval 
is to be obtained from a Special Counsel or Litigation Counsel in the CLO. This 
review  primarily  covers  drafting  clarity,  legal  certainty,  enforceability  and 
compliance with ASIC’s policies in relation to accepting EUs.  















The approval provided is consistent with the approval 
required by the Enforcement Manual—an explicit approval 




The approval provided, while not an explicit approval, 
could be implied. For example, the CLO sending a revised 
draft to the team and the final EU is substantially the same 




There is no decision that could be considered an approval, 
but there is sufficient evidence to indicate that the CLO 




There is no decision that could be considered an approval 
or sufficient evidence of the CLO having had input into the 
EU or its negotiation. 
5 9 
Total  53 100 
Source: ANAO analysis of ASIC decision-making documentation relating to EUs accepted between 
1 January 2012 and 30 June 2014. 
3.52 The  practices  for  obtaining  CLO  approval  for  an  EU  varied 
significantly, on a case‐by‐case basis and depending on  the  staff  involved. A 
particular problem was where  the email chain showed some  involvement by 
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3.53 The  ANAO’s  review  of  CLO  approvals  and  decision‐making 
documentation for the EUs identified that where the CLO was involved in the 
negotiation  and  finalisation  of  an  EU,  useful  guidance  and  advice  to 
enforcement  and/or  stakeholder  teams was provided. CLO  involvement  also 
gave greater assurance of  the quality of EUs,  improving consistency between 




to  improve  the quality of EUs and  reduce  the  risk of drafting  errors.  In  this 
regard, in three EUs reviewed by the ANAO, there were errors in drafting the 
executed  EU  (relating  to  drafting  clarity,  legal  certainty  and  in  one  case, 
enforceability)—for two of these, there was no documented CLO approval.  








rigorous  approval  process  would  provide  quality  assurance  over  the  EU 
process. Accordingly, and consistent with paragraph 3.9, there is considerable 
scope  for  ASIC  to  improve  documentation  of  the  EU  approvals  and 
decision‐making processes.  
                                                     
102  These instances are largely reflected in the ‘Partially Compliant’ category in Table 3.5. 
103  For example, in late 2013, four EUs were being negotiated in which it was proposed that the promisor 
would make community benefit payments in order to remove profits. The CLO provided advice on 
matters including: the nature of the payment; the appropriateness of the recipient for such payments; 
the purpose for such payments; and the legal ability of regulators to have parties pay such amounts. 
Based on this, the CLO developed supplementary guidance on community benefit payments to 
facilitate a consistent approach for including these terms in future EUs. 
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Media and publicity 
3.57 ASIC will usually issue a media release when it secures an EU and will 
‘always assert  the  right  to make a  regulatory outcome public’.104 According  to 
ASIC,  this  is  important  for  regulatory  transparency  and  effective  deterrence. 
This position is consistent with Regulatory Guide 100 and the Enforcement Manual, 




3.58 One  area  where  there  has  been  a  lack  of  consistency  with  respect  to 
media  releases was  in providing a promisor with a copy of  the media  release 
prior  to  its  release. The usual practice was  for ASIC  to provide a  copy of  the 
media  release  to  the  promisor  an  hour  or  two  before  publication.  It  was 
common, however, for promisors to ask for a copy of the media release several 
days prior to its publication so that they could brief relevant stakeholders (such 
as  staff or authorised  representatives). This was generally  rejected, with ASIC 
stating  that  this  was  not  usual  practice.  In  four  cases,  however,  an  EU  was 
provided to a promisor prior to the day of publication of the media release. On 
20  March  2015,  in  a  statement  to  the  Parliamentary  Joint  Committee  on 
Corporations and Financial Services,  the Chairman of ASIC advised  that ASIC 




For  the  majority  (46  of  53)  of  EUs,  ASIC  documentation  demonstrated  some 
comparison being made between an EU and other regulatory options available to 
ASIC. Further, in the seven instances where record keeping was insufficient, ASIC 
was  able  to  advise  the  reasons  why  entering  into  an  EU  would  provide  an 
effective  regulatory outcome.  Importantly,  the ANAO did not  identify any EUs 
where promisors were treated differently based on the size of their business. 
3.60 In general,  terms  included  in EUs provided a proportionate  regulatory 
response to non‐compliance, with individual terms in EUs being clearly aligned 
with  the  misconduct  at  which  those  terms  were  directed.  ASIC  does  not, 
                                                     
104  ASIC, Information Sheet 152: Public Comment, p. 4. 
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firmer  basis  for  requiring  the  inclusion  of  particular  terms  in  EUs.  Terms 
facilitating the monitoring of compliance with EUs were found in a majority of 
EUs  reviewed  (38  of  53). However,  there  is  scope  for ASIC  to  strengthen  its 
capacity  to  assess  compliance  with,  and  the  effectiveness  of,  EUs  by  more 
systematically including reporting obligations in future EUs.  
3.61 Documentation  relating  to  the  decision‐making  process  for  EUs  was 
inconsistent,  dispersed  across  multiple  systems,  and  not  always  readily 
available. The ANAO was able to identify early stage SEL approvals for 41 of 
the  53  EUs  and  late  stage  SEL  approvals  for  28  EUs.  In  regards  to  CLO 
approvals, only 26 of 53 EUs were assessed as fully or largely compliant with 
ASIC  policies.  Even where  documentation was  available,  it was  not  always 
readily  apparent  as  to  why  a  particular  EU  was  accepted.  The  inconsistent 
documentation  of  decisions  and  approvals  poses  risks  to  the  transparency, 
clarity, consistency, and enforceability of EUs. There would be merit  in ASIC 
reinforcing  to  staff  the  importance  of  complying  with  its  policies  and 
procedures,  and  particularly,  documenting  all  decisions  relating  to  the 
acceptance of an EU. 
Recommendation No.2  




enforceable  undertakings  to  be  appropriately  recorded  in  accordance 
with ASIC policies and procedures; and  
(b) formalises  the  processes  for  obtaining  enforceable  undertaking 
approvals. 
ASIC response:  
3.63 Agreed.  Implementation  of  Recommendation  2  will  assist  ASIC  to  ensure 
transparency and consistency in its administration of enforceable undertakings. 
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dealt with appropriately and  in a  timely manner. Monitoring of EUs  is mainly 
undertaken  by  ASIC  but  can  sometimes  involve  an  independent  expert.105 
Adopting  a  risk‐based  approach  to  monitoring  compliance  provides  a  sound 
basis for focusing regulatory effort and cost‐effectively deploying resources. 
4.2 In  its  report,  the  Senate  Economics  References  Committee  raised 
concerns  that  the effectiveness of an EU  in deterring misconduct within or by 
other regulated entities may be diminished by ‘a belief that the compliance with 
the undertaking will not be monitored effectively and the terms not enforced.’ In 
light  of  this,  the Committee  recommended  that  ‘ASIC  should more  vigilantly 





 undertakes  appropriate  assessments  of  independence  and  expertise 
when  approving  independent  experts  and  engages with  independent 
experts to maximise regulatory benefits from the process; and 
 measures  and  reports  on  the  effectiveness  of  the  EU  in  achieving 
desired regulatory outcomes. 




105  An independent expert is a person required to be appointed under the terms of an EU to undertake a 
review of specified matters, and to provide a report on these matters to ASIC and/or the promisor. 
106  Senate Economics References Committee, Performance of the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission, 2014, p. 280. 
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ASIC’s monitoring of compliance 
4.5 Once  ASIC  formally  accepts  an  EU,  the  terms  of  the  undertaking 
become binding on the promisor. While the promisor is ultimately responsible 
for complying with  the EU, ASIC  is responsible for monitoring and verifying 
compliance  after  the  EU  has  been  accepted.  Where  ASIC  considers  that  a 
promisor has failed to comply with any of the terms of an EU, it may apply to a 
court for enforcement of the undertaking.107 
Form and extent of monitoring 
4.6 The  Enforcement  Manual  recognises  that  the  nature  and  extent  of 
monitoring compliance with EUs will depend on  the substantive obligations, 
and  any  reporting  obligations,  in  the  undertaking.  The  Enforcement Manual 
does not specify the form of monitoring that can or should be taken in respect 









107  Courts having jurisdiction to hear matters under section 93AA of the Australian Securities and 
Investments Act 2001 and/or section 322 of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 include 
the Federal Court of Australia and state and territory Supreme Courts. 
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Table 4.1: Common monitoring activities undertaken by ASIC for 
enforceable undertakings 






ASIC had some form of communication with the 




ASIC received the documents required to be 
produced under the terms of the EU, including 
independent expert reports and statements of 




ASIC followed up with a promisor where the promisor 
was late or deficient in complying with undertakings 
under the EU.  
  9 17 
Undertake 
searches 
ASIC undertook searches of relevant databases to 
monitor compliance with undertakings. 
8 15 
Communicate 
with third party 
ASIC had communicated with relevant third parties to 
ascertain compliance with the EU (for example, asking 
a non-profit organisation to confirm a community 
benefit payment had been made). 
7 13 
Source: ANAO analysis of ASIC monitoring documentation relating to EUs accepted between 
1 January 2012 and 30 June 2014. 
Note: Individual EUs can have multiple forms of monitoring. This table does not include most forms of 
monitoring undertaken as part of the independent expert review progress. These forms of 
monitoring are considered in the next section of this chapter. 





promisor  depended  on  the  nature  of  the  EU  and  any  issues  arising.  These 
discussions  ranged  from  the  relatively  straightforward  (such  as  ASIC 
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Case study – Finalising outstanding external administrations 
One of the EUs accepted by ASIC during the review period was from a registered liquidator 
who agreed, among other things, to cease carrying out work that only a registered liquidator 
can perform and to submit a Form 905A cancelling their registration as a liquidator. 
Pursuant to the EU, a Form 905A was submitted within the timeframe specified in the EU. 
However, at the time the form was submitted, the liquidator had some outstanding external 
administrations that were not yet finalised and accordingly, ASIC’s Registry Services and 
Licensing team was unable to action the cancellation form. 
To enable the cancellation to be actioned, ASIC’s Insolvency Practitioners stakeholder team 
worked with the promisor to finalise the external administrations. The Insolvency Practitioners 
team set up alerts to enable it to track the promisor’s progress in finalising these 
administrations and was in regular communication to remind the promisor of his obligations 
and to assist where possible. The external administrations were ultimately finalised and the 
promisor’s Form 905A cancellation of registration actioned, although not within the original 
timeframe outlined in the EU. 
4.9 The ANAO also reviewed the extent to which ASIC monitored the EUs. 
To  undertake  this  review,  the  ANAO  assessed  the  terms  of  each  EU  to 
determine the extent to which ASIC could be expected to actively monitor the 
EU. A higher level of monitoring was expected where the EU was complex or 
involved  ongoing  obligations  (such  as  those  requiring  independent  expert 
reviews  and  involving  complex  arrangements  for  the  remediation  of 
consumers/investors)  compared  to EUs  involving  simple,  one‐off  obligations 
(such  as  correcting  misleading  advertising).  The  ANAO  then  reviewed 
documentation  to  assess  the  extent  to  which  the  EUs  were  monitored.  The 
results of this assessment are shown at Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2: ASIC’s level of monitoring compliance with enforceable 
undertakings 
 Actual level of monitoring 
Expected level of monitoring None Basic Moderate High 
Basic 7 21   3 0 
Moderate 0   1 12 2 
High 0   0   1 6 
Total 7 22 16 8 
Source: ANAO analysis of ASIC monitoring documentation relating to EUs accepted between 
1 January 2012 and 30 June 2014. 
Note: Numbers in cells shaded grey represent EUs where monitoring was below ANAO expectations. 
4.10 The ANAO  identified  adequate monitoring of undertakings  for  44 of 
the  53 EUs  reviewed  (83  per  cent). Of  the  nine  instances where  the  level  of 
monitoring  fell short of expectations,  the main obligation of six of  these EUs 
required  the  individual  to  cease  providing  financial  services  for  a  specified 
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period.  In  respect of  these, documentation was not  available  to demonstrate 
that  the  Financial  Advisers  team  was  monitoring  the  exclusion  of  these 
individuals from the industry.108  
4.11 More generally,  the  form  and  extent  of EU monitoring  activities was 
adequate having regard to the nature of the EUs. Nevertheless, there  is scope 
to  improve  the  documentation  supporting  the  monitoring  activities  and 
allocating responsibility  for monitoring EUs,  for example  to a person  in each 
stakeholder team. These changes would be especially beneficial where the EU 
imposes  ongoing  obligations  but  does  not  include  reporting  requirements 
(such as EUs involving an exclusion from an industry).  
Team conducting the monitoring 
4.12 Broadly,  the  roles  and  responsibilities  for  monitoring  an  EU  will 
depend on  the obligations contained  in  the EU. According  to  the Enforcement 
Manual, where  compliance with  the EU will occur  immediately and  is easily 
verifiable,  verification  is  the  responsibility  of  the  enforcement  team  that 
negotiated  the undertaking. Where  the EU  involves  a  continuing  obligation, 
monitoring is the responsibility of the relevant stakeholder team. To assess the 
extent  to which monitoring  is undertaken  in accordance with  this policy,  the 
ANAO  assessed  which  team  could  be  expected  to  have  responsibility  for 
monitoring  each  EU  reviewed.  The ANAO  then  identified which  team was 
actually monitoring the EU. The results of this analysis are shown at Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3: Monitoring of enforceable undertakings by stakeholder or 
enforcement teams 
 Actual team monitoring EU 
Team expected to monitor EU Enforcement Stakeholder Monitoring not 
undertaken 
Enforcement 9   0 1 
Stakeholder 8 29 6 
Source: ANAO analysis of ASIC monitoring documentation relating to EUs accepted between 
1 January 2012 and 30 June 2014. 
Note: Numbers in cells shaded grey represent EUs that were monitored by a team different to that 
expected to monitor the agreement (based on ASIC guidance). 
                                                     
108  While it can be difficult to monitor compliance with terms in EUs requiring a promisor to cease an 
activity, ASIC’s Financial Reporting and Auditing stakeholder team had a sound process whereby a 
designated member of that team was responsible for monitoring compliance for the seven EUs 
involving the exclusion of a promisor from conducting company audits. 
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4.13 Apart  from  the  seven  EUs  for  which  there  was  no  evidence  of 
monitoring (see Table 4.2 and related discussion), in eight EUs the monitoring 
of compliance was by a different  team  than expected by  the guidance  in  the 
Enforcement  Manual.  In  each  of  these  cases,  this  was  because  the  matter 
remained with  the  enforcement  team  indefinitely  or  for  an  extended  period 
after acceptance of the EU, rather than being transferred to a stakeholder team. 
There was no reason documented  for  the responsibility  for monitoring of  the 
EU not being transferred to the relevant stakeholder team  in accordance with 
ASIC procedures. 
4.14 While  enforcement  teams  can  continue  to monitor  an  EU  containing 
ongoing obligations, this approach may lead to teams being unclear about their 
roles and responsibilities in relation to monitoring EUs. For example, for one of 
the  EUs  reviewed,  there  was  considerable  overlap  between  the  monitoring 
activities  of  the  stakeholder  and  enforcement  teams,  leading  to  confusion 
among staff members about  their  roles and  responsibilities, and  to an expert 
report not being appropriately followed up. More generally, a higher  level of 
engagement  with  independent  experts  was  identified  in  cases  where 
responsibility  for  monitoring  of  an  EU  was  promptly  transferred  to  the 
relevant stakeholder team (see paragraph 4.43). Further, stakeholder teams are 
likely  to  gain  experience  and  expertise  over  time  in  monitoring  EUs 
(particularly in assessing expert reports). 
Breaches of EUs 
4.15 Where ASIC  has  reason  to  believe  that  an EU  is  not  being  complied 
with,  the  Enforcement  Manual  says  it  ‘will  usually  first  try  to  resolve  the 
matter by drawing the matter to the attention of the [promisor].’ In cases where 
the breach  is  ‘of a substantive  term or  involves a  failure of  the  [promisor]  to 
satisfy a material obligation by a certain time’, ASIC’s policy is that it will not 
hesitate to apply to a court to enforce the EU. 
4.16 To assess ASIC’s  identification of, and  responses  to, breaches of EUs, 
the  ANAO  assessed  compliance  with  the  terms  in  the  EUs  based  on 
information  available  to  ASIC.109  In  making  this  assessment,  the  ANAO 
reviewed data sources  including EU monitoring documentation, key systems 
                                                     
109  For some terms, it was not possible to make an assessment as the obligation was future-dated, the 
EU did not contain reporting obligations or it was not otherwise practical to make an assessment 
(because the information needed to assess compliance was not available to ASIC and/or the ANAO). 
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had  been  published).  A  summary  of  the  ANAO’s  assessment  is  shown  at 
Table 4.4, which focuses on the more common obligations. 
Table 4.4: Breaches of terms of enforceable undertakings 



























Reviews by independent experts  
Provide a report on specified matters prepared 
by an independent expert 30 20 20 0 0 
Provide remediation plans in response to 
recommendations 14 8 8 0 0 
Certification of implementation of 
recommendations made by an expert 11 6 6 0 0 
Limiting activities 
Not provide financial services or services, or 
engage in credit activities 15 15 15 0 0 
Not perform any duties or functions that can only 
be carried out by a registered liquidator or 
registered company auditor 
11 11 11 0 0 
Not take part in the management of any 
company 5 5 4 1 20 
Continuing professional education 
Individual to undertake specified education 13 6 4 2 33 
Company to ensure specified company officers 
undertake specified education 5 5 4 1 20 
Other 
Cancellation of registration as a liquidator or 
company auditor 6 6 6 0 0 
Payment of an amount to a specified 
not-for-profit organisation 4 4 4 0 0 
Rectification to consumers/investors (such as 
compensation and corrective letters to clients) 14 8 8 0 0 
Source:  ANAO analysis of ASIC EU monitoring documentation, ASIC registry and licensing databases, 
websites and other information relating to EUs accepted between 1 January 2012 and 
30 June 2014. 
 
ANAO Report No.38 2014–15 
Administration of Enforceable Undertakings 
 
90 
Notes to Table 4.4 
Note 1: The analysis is necessarily constrained by the available information. In the case of a promisor who 
has agreed to refrain from providing financial services and subsequently obtains employment with 
a financial service provider, it is unlikely that ASIC will identify this non-compliance except by 
receiving a complaint. The analysis is not intended to confirm that undertakings have been 
complied with, rather it provides assurance that there was no information in ASIC’s possession to 
indicate that an undertaking had not been complied with. 
Note 2: A term was assessed where: the obligation was current at 15 November 2014; and information 
was available to enable an assessment—either because the EU had a reporting obligation or 
relevant information was available on ASIC’s various databases (including companies register, 
professional registers and complaints). 
4.17 The ANAO identified four EUs where there was non‐compliance with an 
obligation in an EU—three of these related to non‐compliance with a continuing 
professional education obligation and one  related  to a promisor  taking part  in 
the management of a company despite an undertaking to refrain from doing so. 
In  addition  to  the  above,  there were  seven EUs where  an  obligation was not 
complied  with  in  accordance  with  the  timeframe  specified  in  the  EU.  In  all 
instances, ASIC was aware of the non‐compliance. No instances were identified 
where  information was  available  to ASIC  about  non‐compliance with  an EU, 
and the relevant team was unaware of that non‐compliance. 
4.18 For the two instances where an individual has not complied with their 
undertaking  to  complete  specified  continuing  professional  education,  both 
individuals  had  advised ASIC  that  they were unemployed  and  in  one  case, 
unable  to  afford  the  course  fees. ASIC  has  not  demanded  strict  compliance 
with these undertakings. In the case of the company failing to ensure officers 
complete  the education,  this was due  to differing expectations between ASIC 
and  the promisor. To gain assurance  that  the obligation had been met, ASIC 
required  the  company  to  promptly  fulfil  the  educational  requirements  and 
have  the  appointed  independent  expert  produce  a  supplementary  report  in 
relation to that non‐compliance (and certain other specified matters).  
4.19 The one identified instance of non‐compliance with an undertaking not 
to  take  part  in  the  management  of  a  corporation  came  to  ASIC’s  attention 
through  a  complaint  from  the  public.  In  response  to  the  complaint,  ASIC 
contacted  the promisor and  relevant  third parties  to determine whether  there 
had been a breach of the EU and sought relevant information. Although ASIC 
was  of  the  view  that  a  breach  had  occurred,  it  determined  that  it  had 
insufficient evidence of the breach and that in any event, the risk posed to the 
public  was  limited.  A  letter  was  sent  to  the  promisor  to  reinforce  their 
obligations under the EU. Overall, and in the context of a risk‐based regulatory 
framework,  ASIC’s  approach  to  responding  to  breaches  of  an  EU  has  been 
suitable for the EUs reviewed by the ANAO.   
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Responding to complaints of a breach of an EU 
4.20 An important means for ASIC to identify potential breaches of an EU is 
through complaints received  from  the public, as  illustrated above. Reports of 
misconduct received  from  the public  through ASIC’s website are assessed by 
the  Misconduct  and  Breach  Reporting  (M&BR)  team.  M&BR  also  deal  with 




of  an EU,  the ANAO  reviewed  the  71  cases  in  the Complaints Management 
System  for which  the  activity description  included  a  reference  to  an EU. Of 
these,  19  related  to  the  53  EUs  reviewed  as  part  of  this  audit.  A  diagram 
summarising the results of the ANAO’s testing is shown at Figure 4.1. 
Figure 4.1: Outcomes of reports of misconduct relating to enforceable 
undertakings 
 




the  appropriate  stakeholder  or  enforcement  team.  In  two  of  the  four  cases 
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where  the  report was not  referred,  the  stakeholder  team advised  that  it was 
already  aware  of  the  information  and  that  the  matter  did  not  need  to  be 




Use of independent experts 
4.23 One way  that ASIC monitors  compliance with  EUs  is  to  require  the 
appointment  of  an  independent  expert  to  report  to ASIC  (either  directly  or 
through  the  promisor)  on  specified matters.  In  the  review  period,  30  of  the 
53 EUs  included  a  term  requiring  a  review  to  be  undertaken  by  an 
independent expert. The  form of  review depended on  the particular EU, but 
could be generalised into one of four types, as outlined in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5: Types of independent expert review required under 
enforceable undertakings 




Compliance with laws. Review advice or services provided by the 
promisor to determine if these have been provided in accordance with 
relevant laws and regulations. 
15 50 
Compliance framework. Review the systems, processes and 
procedures of the promisor to establish whether these effectively 
support compliance with relevant laws and regulations. 
12 40 
Compliance with EU. Review whether the promisor has discharged 
their obligations under the EU. 
1 3 
Multiple. Where the EU requires multiple reviews to be undertaken, 
involving a combination of the above matters. 
2(1) 7 
Total 30 100 
Source: ANAO analysis of EUs entered into from 1 January 2012 to 30 June 2014. 
Note 1: One of these EUs involved a review of an individual’s compliance with legislation and a review of 
the firm’s compliance framework. The other EU involved a review of the promisor’s compliance 
with legislation and compliance with the EU (in terms of an obligation to refund consumers). 
4.24 The requirement to appoint an independent expert can have a number 
of  potential  benefits,  including  allowing  for  the  independent  verification  of 
remedial action and shifting the cost of monitoring compliance with the EU to 
the  promisor.  However,  in  its  report,  the  Senate  Economics  References 
Committee  identified  some  concerns  regarding  the  management  of  the 
independent  expert  process,  including  in  relation  to  transparency  and  the 
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appointment  process.  In  particular,  the  Committee  queried  the  degree  of 
certainty around the obligations of the expert, what constitutes expertise, and 
how potential conflicts of interest should be resolved.110 The remainder of this 
section considers  the process  for appointing  independent experts,  the reports 
produced and ASIC’s engagement with independent experts.  
Appointing independent experts 




for  example,  if  the  independent  expert  was  approved  before  the  EU  was 
accepted.  Table  4.6  outlines  the  arrangements  for  approving  independent 
experts under the EUs reviewed by the ANAO. 
Table 4.6: Arrangements for approving independent experts under 
enforceable undertakings 
 ASIC approval of terms of reference  
ASIC approval of expert Yes Prior to 
EU(1) 
No Total 
Yes, approval required 12 3 7 22 
Approved prior to or when 
accepting EU 
0 2 0 2 
No approval required 0 3 3 6 
Total 12 8 10 30 
Source: ANAO analysis of EUs entered into from 1 January 2012 to 30 June 2014. 
Note 1: ‘Prior to EU’ indicates instances where the terms of reference were agreed before the acceptance 
of the EU because the independent expert was engaged prior to acceptance of the EU, or because 
the EU prescribes a form of terms of reference (attached as an appendix to the EU) to be used 
when engaging an independent expert. 
4.26 As Table 4.6  indicates, ASIC’s approval of  the expert was  required  in 
24 of  the 30 EUs where an  independent review was  to be undertaken. Of  the 
six EUs  that did not require ASIC’s approval of  the  independent expert,  four 
related  to  financial  advisers  who,  following  the  resumption  of  work  after 
completing  their  periods  of  suspension,  were  required  to  have  reviews 
undertaken  of  the  compliance  of  financial  advice  provided  by  them  with 
                                                     
110  Senate Economics References Committee, Performance of the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission, 2014, pp. 269–270, 280. 
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reviewer.111  It was not  clear why ASIC’s  approval was not  required  in  these 
cases when  for similar EUs  (such as EUs  involving auditors and  liquidators), 
ASIC was required to provide a final approval. 




it  is  important  that  ASIC  has  a  clear  policy  and  consistent  practices  in 
appointing independent experts and their terms of reference. 
Appointing experts in accordance with the EU 
4.28 Of the 22 EUs where ASIC’s approval was required112: an approval was 
provided for 15 EUs; there was no record of approval for two EUs; and for the 
remaining  five  EUs,  approvals  were  not  yet  required  as  the  obligation  to 
engage an expert was  future‐dated or contingent. Documented consideration 
of  the  appropriateness  (expertise  and/or  independence)  of  an  expert  was 
identified for 10 of the 15 EUs where an approval had been given. 




ASIC’s consideration of the independence and expertise of experts 
4.30 ASIC’s  consideration  of  the  independent  expert  and  their  terms  of 
reference  varied  between  EUs.  While  lacking  a  systematic  approach  to 
considering  independent  experts’  independence  and  expertise,  common 
considerations included:  
 the performance of an expert in past reviews conducted under an EU; 
 the  results  of  data  warehouse  and  mainframe  system  searches 
(particularly, whether there have been past complaints/issues regarding 
                                                     
111  The other two EUs also provided some guidance—one required the expert to be an ‘independent, 
third-party auditor’, and the other required an assessment from ‘one or more suitably qualified and 
experienced person(s)’. 
112  As indicated in Table 4.6, two EUs were also approved prior to or when an accepting EU. 
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the  proposed  reviewer,  and  whether  the  search  identifies  connections 
between  the  promisor  and  reviewer  that  could  suggest  a  conflict  of 
interest); and 
 reviews  of  the  curriculum  vitae  and  statements  of  independence 
provided by the expert. 
4.31 In  four  of  the  10  EUs  reviewed  where  there  was  documented 




independent  expert  lacked  the  relevant  qualifications,  regulatory  knowledge 




4.32 While ASIC generally undertakes adequate assessments  in  relation  to 
the  appointment  of  independent  experts,  the practices  for  this differ  greatly 
between  teams  and  on  a  case‐by‐case  basis.  The  fact  that ASIC  rejected  the 
independent expert  initially proposed by the promisor  in 40 per cent of cases 
where  there  was  documented  consideration  of  the  appropriateness  of  the 
independent expert, underscores  the  importance of consideration by ASIC of 
the  independence  and  expertise  of  experts  proposed  by  promisors,  and  the 
content of their terms of engagement.  
4.33 In February 2015, a revised Regulatory Guide 100 was released that deals 
with many  of  the  above matters.  Importantly,  the  revised Guide  states  that 
where a promisor is to appoint an independent expert under an EU, ASIC will 
require  a  term  in  the  EU  that  the  promisor  obtains  ASIC’s  approval  of  the 
appointment and of the terms of reference. The guide also lists considerations 
to be  taken  into account when determining whether an expert demonstrates: 
competence  to undertake  the  engagement;  independence  from  the promisor; 
and  the  existence  of  adequate  arrangements  to  manage  conflicts  of  interest 
arising  during  the  engagement.  While  the  revised  Regulatory Guide  100  is  a 
significant  improvement,  there  would  be  merit  in  ASIC  supporting  the 
amendments  with  practical  assistance  to  staff  on  how  to  apply  the  revised 
Guide by making amendments to its internal guidance on EUs. 
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4.36 The  ANAO  assessed  35  reports  provided  to  ASIC  against  these 
criteria.113 The results of this assessment are shown at Table 4.7. 
Table 4.7: ANAO assessment of independent expert reports 
Criteria ANAO Assessment 
Address EU requirements All but one fully or substantially addressed the 
requirements. 
Comprehensive (such as including details 
about the testing performed, the analysis, 
results and high-level conclusions) 
Of the 35 reports, 24 were very comprehensive, 
seven sufficiently comprehensive and four 
provided limited information. 
Meaningful recommendations (that is, 
whether they provided real and practical 
ways for the issues identified to be 
remedied) 
Of the 35 reports, 29 made 
recommendations—in all but two of these 
reports, the recommendations were 
meaningful.  
Source: ANAO analysis of 35 independent expert reports received by ASIC pursuant to EUs accepted 
between 1 January 2012–30 June 2014. 
4.37 Although some stakeholders raised concerns with the ANAO about the 
quality  of  reviewers  appointed  by  some  promisors,  this  was  generally  not 
supported  by  an  assessment  of  reports  produced  by  those  reviewers.  The 
overwhelming majority of reports reviewed were of sufficient quality having 
regard  to  addressing  the  EU  requirements,  being  comprehensive  and 
containing meaningful recommendations.  
                                                     
113  These 35 reports were in relation to the 20 EUs accepted during the review period for which an expert 
report had been submitted pursuant to the EU.  
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these  cases, ASIC  also  identified  issues with  the  quality  of  the  report. ASIC 
discussed  these concerns with both  the promisor and  the  independent expert 
and  required  a  supplementary  report  to  be  provided  to  respond  to  the 








Table 4.8: Findings of independent expert reports 




Positive—the report identified no or only very minor issues with 
the promisor’s compliance arrangements, or compliance with the 
EU or with specific legislation. 
13 37 
Generally positive—the report did not identify any major issues.   4 11 
Mixed—the report identified one or more major issues, but these 
were balanced against the promisor’s generally positive conduct 
in respect of other areas. 
10 29 
Generally negative—the report identified one or more major 
issues not balanced by positive findings in other areas.   5 14 
Negative—multiple major issues were identified that indicated 
systemic issues with the promisor’s compliance arrangements, or 
compliance with the EU or with specified legislation. 
  3   9 
Source: ANAO analysis of 35 independent expert reports received by ASIC pursuant to EUs accepted 
between 1 January 2012 and 30 June 2014. 
   
                                                     
114  The fact that an independent expert makes a positive assessment of a promisor’s compliance is not, of 
course, evidence, prima-facie or otherwise, that an expert has failed to apply professional scepticism. 
In many cases, a positive assessment will be warranted as the promisor may have improved their 
processes and procedures since acceptance of the EU. Nevertheless, given that each of the reports 
was prepared because ASIC had concerns about a promisor’s compliance, it was expected that at 
least some reports would identify elements of non-compliance. 
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that appropriate  remedial action  is  taken by promisors  in  response  to  issues 




4.41 For  each  of  the  20  EUs  where  an  independent  expert  had  been 
appointed and a report produced, the ANAO assessed the level of engagement 
and  follow‐up by ASIC  in relation  to  the expert and  their reports. There was 
evidence of ASIC communicating directly with  the  independent  reviewer  for 
12 of these 20 EUs. The extent and nature of these discussions varied between 
EUs,  ranging  from ASIC  providing  input  into  the  reviewer’s  scope  of work 
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Case Study – ASIC’s ongoing monitoring of an EU with Macquarie Equities Limited 
On 29 January 2013, ASIC accepted an EU from Macquarie Equities Limited (MEL) following 
ASIC identifying some recurring compliance deficiencies by, and in the supervision of, MEL’s 
advisers. The EU concluded on 29 January 2015, following receipt by ASIC of the final 
independent expert report. 
Due to the matter involving a large participant in the wealth management industry, and its high 
public profile, ASIC had close and ongoing involvement with MEL and the independent expert 
appointed under the EU. As a demonstration of ASIC’s level of engagement, 2.3 full time 
equivalent staff were dedicated to the EU. Three examples of ASIC’s monitoring of the EU are 
provided below, relating to: ASIC’s engagement with the expert; its role in the adviser reviews; 
and its input into the client remediation methodology. 
Engagement with the expert 
ASIC held regular meetings and teleconferences (often several times a week) with MEL and the 
independent expert, both together and independently. During these meetings, ASIC received 
updates on the status of MEL’s initiatives and provided feedback to MEL on how it can best 
address ASIC’s concerns. Under the EU, ASIC was provided with confidential independent 
expert reports. There was evidence of close consideration by ASIC of these reports. In some 
instances, ASIC asked the independent expert to undertake specific testing and review on 
matters of interest to ASIC so that it could gain further assurance in relation to the EU.  
Role in adviser reviews 
Under the EU, MEL was required to implement a mechanism to identify advisers with poor 
compliance, undertake a review of those advisers’ files and rectify concerns identified about the 
conduct of those advisers. ASIC has monitored the process and the results of this review. 
Where advisers were identified as having poor compliance, ASIC has reviewed these cases 
and, in some instances, is taking further action. As a result of the adviser review program, there 
are a number of individual former advisers currently being investigated by ASIC, and some other 
advisers in relation to whom ASIC is making inquiries that may lead to a formal investigation. 
A large part of the adviser review was undertaken by MEL using Key Risk Indicators (KRIs) to 
identify advisers who may have been at risk of having poor compliance. Given the importance of 
these KRIs to the adviser review process, ASIC engaged with MEL and the expert at an early 
stage to provide its input and feedback on the indicators proposed by MEL. As a result of ASIC’s 
input into the process, drawing on experience across the industry more widely, MEL agreed to 
include a number of additional KRIs and to amend some KRIs.  
Input into client remediation methodology 
One term in the EU required that where MEL identifies that a client has been disadvantaged due 
to the failings of an adviser, MEL is obliged to remediate the client where appropriate. To help 
ensure clients are appropriately remediated, MEL and ASIC commenced discussions about 
MEL’s proposed remediation methodology at an early stage which resulted in ASIC providing 
feedback on MEL’s remediation methodology. These discussions took place over a number of 
months, with MEL considering that it was necessary to refine its remediation process, based in 
part on feedback from ASIC and the independent expert. 
One of the areas of particular interest for ASIC was in having an independent expert to oversee 
the client remediation process. After discussion with ASIC, MEL engaged a professional 
services firm to oversee the client remediation process even though not required to do so under 
the EU. ASIC provided feedback on the firm’s role and scope of work. ASIC’s continued 
engagement with MEL has also contributed to other enhancements to the remediation process, 
including $5000 being offered to all clients to obtain independent advice on the reviews 
conducted by MEL, rather than only those clients who are offered compensation. Also, MEL has 
aligned its processes with those of the Financial Services Ombudsman and broadened the 
scope of clients that can escalate their complaint to the Ombudsman. 
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to  ASIC,  documentation  (such  as  a  memo,  working  paper  or  email)  was 
available that demonstrated ASIC had assessed reports for 15 of these EUs. In 
13  cases, ASIC  had  requested  further  information  or  arranged  a meeting  to 
discuss  the  report  with  the  promisor.  Importantly,  ASIC  undertook 
appropriate  follow‐ups  in  relation  to  seven  of  the  eight  reports  having 
‘Negative’ or ‘Generally Negative’ findings against the promisor. For the other 
EU,  follow‐up  is  to occur after  the promisor has submitted  their statement of 
implementation of recommendations.  
4.43 There was a higher  level of engagement with  the  independent expert 





would  be  merit  in  ASIC  taking  steps  to  ensure  that  responsibility  for 
monitoring EUs with expert reporting obligations is transferred to the relevant 
stakeholder  team  so  that  appropriate  consideration  is  given  to  the  reports 
produced under the EU. 
4.44 Overall,  ASIC’s  engagement  with  independent  experts  generally 
reflected  an  appropriate  risk‐based  approach. The differences  in  the  extent  to 
which ASIC engaged with  the expert  review process  (through communication 




as part of  the  reviews  conducted by  the  independent  expert. Nevertheless,  in 
light  of  the  five  cases where  there was  no  documentation  to  demonstrate  an 
assessment of  the  independent  expert  reports,  there  is  scope  for better  record 
keeping and documentation of the independent expert process. 
Public reporting on compliance with enforceable 
undertakings 
4.45 In  its  report,  the  Senate  Economics  References  Committee  raised 
concerns  about  the  transparency  of  compliance with EUs. Having  regard  to 
this, the Committee recommended that ASIC: 
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consider  ways  to  make  the  monitoring  of  ongoing  compliance  with  the 
undertaking more transparent, such as requiring that reports on the progress 
of  achieving  the  undertaking’s  objectives  are,  to  the  extent  possible,  made 
public.115 
4.46 This  recommendation  was  in  addition  to  the  recommendation 
discussed  in  Chapter  2  that  ASIC  include  in  its  annual  report  additional 






EUs  (including by  allowing ASIC  to  refer  to  the  findings  of  expert  reports), 
unless  a  Commissioner  determines  otherwise.  In  February  2015,  Regulatory 
Guide  100  was  revised  to  reflect  a  final  position  on  the  public  reporting  of 
outcomes.  The  revised Guide makes  clear  to  regulated  entities  that  for  EUs 
accepted in the future, ASIC will report on whether the undertakings given by 
a promisor  in an EU have been complied with. The revised Guide also states 
that  where  an  EU  requires  reporting  by  an  independent  expert,  ASIC  will 
make  ‘available  publicly  a  summary  of  the  final  report  or  a  statement  that 
refers to the content of the report’.117 
4.48 While not  forming part of  the broad  sample,  the ANAO assessed  the 
11 EUs entered into by ASIC between 4 August 2014 and 31 December 2014 to 
determine  whether  their  terms  reflect  the  interim  policy  outlined  in  the 




115  Senate Economics References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Performance of the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission, 2014, p. 280. 
116  Senate Economics References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Performance of the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission, 2014, p. 280. 
117  ASIC, Regulatory Guide 100: Enforceable Undertakings, February 2015, p. 25. 
118  As at January 2015, no reports had been published in accordance with the new policy. The two EUs 
that were not consistent with the interim policy involved, in one case, an individual agreeing to not 
provide financial services, and in the other case, an individual agreeing to not perform any acts or 
functions that require registration as a company auditor. Under the final policy in Regulatory Guide 
100, ASIC will not report on compliance with these types of undertakings unless it becomes aware of a 
failure to comply. 
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Evaluating the effectiveness of EUs in achieving improved 
compliance 
4.49 While  it  is  important  for  transparency  that  compliance  with  EUs  is 
reported, it is also important that ASIC goes further and assesses more broadly 
the effectiveness of each EU in achieving improved compliance. 
4.50 As  discussed  in  Chapter  2,  ASIC  does  not  currently  systematically 
measure and report  (internally or publicly) on  the effectiveness of  individual 
EUs in achieving desired outcomes. Though stakeholder teams and SELs often 
have  a  sense  about  the  effectiveness  of  particular  EUs  in  generating 
behavioural  change,  there  would  be  merit  in  ASIC  taking  steps  to  more 





in  subsequent  reports  compared  to  the  initial  report—suggesting  that 
the review process had led to improved compliance120; 
 in one  case, after acceptance of an EU and  following an  independent 
expert review process, an Australian financial services  licensee (AFSL) 
began  submitting AFSL breach  reports  in  relation  to newly  identified 
instances of prior non‐compliance—suggesting  that  the EU had  led  to 
the promisor taking their AFSL obligations more seriously; and 
 in one case, ASIC continued to receive regular reports of misconduct in 
relation  to  the conduct of  franchisees of a  franchisor whom ASIC had 
accepted an EU from—suggesting that greater attention may need to be 
given when accepting future EUs involving franchise operations. 





119  These include: Australian financial services licensee breach reporting obligations; auditors’ breach 
reports; and liquidator and auditors’ annual statements. 
120  For the other three EUs, the ANAO did not identify an improvement as the findings of the first report 
were already positive.  
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nature  of  the  obligations  in  EUs.  Generally,  the  monitoring  activities 
undertaken were appropriate in the circumstances and the level of monitoring 
was also adequate in a majority of cases (44 of 53 EUs reviewed). Where ASIC 
possessed  information  suggesting  a  breach  of  an  EU,  it  had  identified  the 
breach and responded appropriately. 
4.53 In terms of its use of independent reviews, there were inconsistencies in 
the process  for appointing  independent experts under an EU. Of  the 30 EUs 
that  required an  independent expert  to be appointed, 13 did not provide  for 
ASIC to approve the expert and/or their terms of reference. ASIC has recently 
released  new  public  guidance  that  requires  these  approvals.  Where  the  EU 
required ASIC to provide relevant approvals, there was documented evidence 
of ASIC having provided those approvals. However, the inquiries undertaken 
and  judgments  made  to  support  the  approval  of  an  expert  were  not 
consistently  documented.  To  support  a  more  consistent  approach  to  the 
approval  of  independent  experts  and  their  terms  of  reference, ASIC  should 
consider  complementing  its  public  guidance  on  independent  experts  with 
internal  guidance  to  staff  on  the  steps  to  be  taken  in  approving  the 
appointment of an independent expert. 
4.54 In  response  to  the  Senate  Economics  References  Committee’s 
recommendation  that ASIC  consider ways  of  increasing  the  transparency  of 
monitoring  compliance  with  EUs,  in  August  2014  ASIC  introduced  interim 
guidance requiring  the public reporting of outcomes of EUs. A  final position 
was  reached  in February 2015, with  the  release of a  revised Regulatory Guide 
100. EUs entered  into since August 2014 have generally been accepted  in  line 
with the new policy.  
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Appendix 1: Entity Response 
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Appendix 2: Terms in Enforceable Undertakings 
Reviewed 
Table A.1: Common terms included in the enforceable undertakings 
entered into from 1 January 2012 to 30 June 2014. 




Thirty EUs contained a term requiring the promisor to appoint 
an independent expert to undertake a review of some kind, 
with one or more reviews to be provided to ASIC upon 
completion of the review.  
The content of the review varied depending on the specific 
EU. Where the EU was entered with a business, common 
types of reviews were of the business’ compliance framework, 
compliance with specified legislation or compliance with the 
EU. Where the EU was with an individual, the independent 
review was generally an audit of whether advice or services 
provided by the promisor, or on behalf of the promisor, during 
a specified period was in conformance with relevant laws and 
regulation. 
Depending on the nature of the review, the promisor was 
required to prepare and implement a remediation plan in 





In 18 EUs, a term required the completion of specified 
continuing professional education. Thirteen of these 
undertakings were with individuals where that particular 
individual was directed to undertake the education. In five 
cases, the EU was entered into with a company and required 
the specified officers of the company (such as directors) to 
undertake the education. 
18 
Rectification In 14 EUs, there was a term requiring rectification in some 
form. The form of rectification required varied significantly 
depending on the relevant misconduct. Examples of 
rectification included: 
 the company agreeing not to rely on its misconduct (such 
as not relying on improperly obtained mortgages or 
consents); 
 refund of improperly obtained monies; and 
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In 27 EUs involving individuals, there was an undertaking that 
the individual would cease engaging in specified activities or 
cease providing specified services either permanently 
(10 EUs) or for a specified period. These undertakings 
required the individual to not: 
 provide financial services (12 EUs); 
 engage in credit activities (three EUs); 
 perform functions for which registration as a company 
auditor is required under the Corporations Act 2001 
(seven EUs); 
 perform duties or functions for which registration is 
required as a liquidator under the Corporations Act 2001 
(four EUs); and 
 take part in the management of a corporation (five EUs).  
In some EUs, there were multiple such clauses (such as a 
requirement not to provide financial services and not to 




In six EUs, all involving individual auditors or liquidators, ASIC 
accepted a term where the auditor or liquidator agreed to 
cancel their registration as an auditor or liquidator. This was in 
addition to not performing duties or functions for which 





In four EUs, ASIC accepted a term where the promisor 
agreed to contribute to specified community organisations 
(Financial Literacy Australia, Pilbara Community Legal 
Service and the Indigenous Consumer Assistance Network).  
4 
Other The flexibility of EUs meant that in nine EUs, terms were 
included that did not align with the categories above. These 
included terms requiring finalising outstanding lodgements, 
changing advertising and maintaining membership to an 
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Better Practice Guides 
The following Better Practice Guides are available on the ANAO website: 
Public Sector Financial Statements: High‐quality reporting through 
good governance and processes 
Mar. 2015 
Public Sector Audit Committees: Independent assurance and advice for 
Accountable Authorities 
Mar. 2015 
Successful Implementation of Policy Initiatives  Oct. 2014 
Public Sector Governance: Strengthening performance through good 
governance 
June 2014 
Administering Regulation: Achieving the right balance  June 2014 
Implementing Better Practice Grants Administration  Dec. 2013 
Human Resource Management Information Systems: Risks and 
Controls 
June 2013 
Public Sector Internal Audit: An Investment in Assurance and Business 
Improvement 
Sept. 2012 
Public Sector Environmental Management: Reducing the Environmental 
Impacts of Public Sector Operations 
Apr. 2012 
Developing and Managing Contracts: Getting the Right Outcome, 
Achieving Value for Money 
Feb. 2012 
Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities  Mar. 2011 
Strategic and Operational Management of Assets by Public Sector 
Entities: Delivering Agreed Outcomes through an Efficient and 
Optimal Asset Base 
Sept. 2010 
Planning and Approving Projects – an Executive Perspective: Setting the 
Foundation for Results 
June 2010 
Innovation in the Public Sector: Enabling Better Performance, Driving 
New Directions 
Dec. 2009 
SAP ECC 6.0: Security and Control  June 2009 
Business Continuity Management: Building Resilience in Public Sector 
Entities 
June 2009 
Developing and Managing Internal Budgets  June 2008 
 
 
